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1. I previously submitted an opening report in this matter on June 5, 
2015 (“Cornell Report”),1 which sets forth my qualifications and in which I opined 
that the fair value of Dell as of the Appraisal Date was $28.61 per share.2  Also on 
June 5, 2015, Professors Glenn Hubbard and Stephen Shay submitted reports on 
behalf of Respondent (“Hubbard Report” and “Shay Report,” respectively).    
2. Counsel for Petitioners asked me to review and comment on Professor 
Hubbard’s opinions as set forth in his report.3  
II. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS 
3. Based on my analysis of the record evidence and the results of the 
economic analyses described below, as well as my background and expertise, I 
have reached the following conclusions: 
 Professor Hubbard makes downward adjustments to his selected 
projections that are unsupported by the facts in the record and 
inconsistent with assumptions made by Dell’s management and Silver 
Lake in developing contemporaneous projections used in the normal 
course of business.  These adjustments understate Professor 
Hubbard’s concluded value using his BCG Case free cash flow 
                                                            
1  Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the same meaning as in the 
Cornell Report. 
2  Cornell Report, ¶ 18. 
3  I also respond to certain opinions expressed in Professor Shay’s report that 
relate to positions Professor Hubbard adopts in his expert report regarding the 
valuation implications of Dell’s tax rate and alleged tax obligations. 
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projections (the “Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case”) by $5.04 per share.4 
 The projections Professor Hubbard selected for his discounted cash 
flow (“DCF”) analyses also improperly understated the expected 
impact of Dell’s cost savings initiatives.  These adjustments 
understate Professor Hubbard’s concluded value using the Hubbard 
Adjusted BCG Case projections by $3.52 per share.5 
 Professor Hubbard makes adjustments to Dell’s cash balance and 
deducts tax liabilities that are inappropriate and inconsistent with 
contemporaneous DCF valuations as of the Appraisal Date.  These 
adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s concluded value using 
the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections by $5.59 per share.6 
 Professor Hubbard makes certain assumptions that inflate his estimate 
of Dell’s WACC.  These adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s 
concluded value using the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections 
by $0.57 per share.7 
 Professor Hubbard’s arguments why a Sum-of-the-Parts (“SOTP”) 
trading multiples analysis is inapplicable to Dell are not credible given 
Dell management’s and analysts’ use of this valuation method.  Nor 
do his criticisms cause me to question the appropriateness of my use 
of SOTP DCF and trading multiples analyses as reasonableness 
                                                            
4  Professor Hubbard examined the sensitivity of his concluded value based on a 
DCF valuation using the Bank Case projections, after applying similar 
downward adjustments (“Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case”).  These adjustments 
understate Professor Hubbard’s DCF value using the Hubbard Adjusted Bank 
Case projections by $5.04 per share. 
5  These adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s DCF value using the 
Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections by $4.20 per share. 
6  These adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s DCF value using the 
Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections by $5.60 per share. 
7  These adjustments understate Professor Hubbard’s DCF value using the 
Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections by $0.75 per share.  Revised Exhibit 
1 shows that the sum of the individual adjustments is less (more) than the total 
difference between Professor Hubbard and my DCF valuations for the Hubbard 
Adjusted BCG projections (Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case) projections.  The 
reason is that certain of the adjustments affecting the free cash flow projections 
have a cumulating impact when aggregated. 
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checks on the results of my consolidated DCF valuation.    
4. I provide the support for my opinions in the sections that follow.  
Finally, I further support the reasonableness of my fair value conclusion based on 
the DCF valuation of Dell as of October 29, 2013 prepared by E&Y for financial 
accounting purposes that Professor Hubbard uses as support for certain of his 
valuation assumptions.  After considering the Hubbard Report, I continue to 
conclude that the fair value of Dell as of October 29, 2013 was $28.61 per share.8 
III. PROFESSOR HUBBARD’S ADJUSTMENTS TO HIS SELECTED 
PROJECTIONS ARE SUBJECTIVE AND UNFOUNDED 
5. In performing his DCF analyses, Professor Hubbard described the 
Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case as “the most accurate and reliable overall view of the 
Company’s potential future cash flows through FY2017 as a public company.”9  
Professor Hubbard also performed a DCF valuation of Dell using the Bank Case 
projections.  In support of using these projections, Professor Hubbard noted that 
the “Bank Case … is useful to consider for corroboration” of his analysis because 
“it was closest in time to the valuation date, had management involvement, and 
included information shown to potential lenders and rating agencies.”10 
                                                            
8  Appendix A contains a list of the documents that I relied upon in forming my 
opinions set forth in this report 
9  Hubbard Report, ¶ 187. 
10  Hubbard Report, ¶ 187. 
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6. According to Professor Hubbard, he needed to make “certain 
adjustments” to the BCG Case and Bank Case projections “to reflect the change in 
market conditions between the time they were prepared in late 2012/early 2013 and 
the Merger date of October 29, 2013.”11  More specifically, Professor Hubbard 
revised BCG’s original revenue projections to take into account subsequent (and 
more pessimistic) International Data Corp. (“IDC”) PC sales forecasts and Dell’s 
earlier revenue attachment rates for Support & Deployment (“S&D”) services even 
though neither Dell’s management nor BCG had updated its projections as of the 
Appraisal Date.  Further, while Professor Hubbard characterizes his forecast as the 
“Adjusted BCG 25% Case,” the annual cost savings used by Professor Hubbard are 
not the same cost savings associated with the BCG 25% Case as discussed in the 
May Proxy.12  The May Proxy described cost saving scenarios of 25% and 75% of 
Dell management’s $3.3 billion in annual cost savings.  In addition, Professor 
Hubbard extended his forecast period for both sets of projections by an additional 
five years for the sole purpose of justifying his valuation amounts given his 
perpetuity growth rate and his WACC estimate.  Finally, Professor Hubbard used 
Dell’s combined marginal tax rate of 35.8% during the terminal period in both sets 
                                                            
11  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 190, 279. 
12  May Proxy, pp. 100-101. 
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of projections, assuming that Dell would necessarily repatriate its offshore cash at 
that point and thus incur significantly higher tax liabilities.   
7. As I describe in greater detail below, not only are these adjustments 
subjective and unfounded, they result in the creation of an entirely new set of 
projections based solely upon Professor Hubbard’s ex post opinions.  Further, 
every one of these adjustments reduces Professor Hubbard’s estimate of Dell’s per 
share equity value.  Taken together, Professor Hubbard’s adjustments result in an 
understatement of Dell’s implied equity value of $5.04 per share for both the 
Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case.  (See Revised 
Exhibit 1.) 
A. Updated PC Industry Forecasts 
8. Professor Hubbard adjusts both the BCG Base Case and Bank Case 
projections to use IDC’s PC industry forecasts published in August 2013.  This 
change alone lowers his DCF valuations using the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case by 
$1.35 per share and the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case by $0.21 per share.   
9. According to Professor Hubbard, the Base Case projections that BCG 
used to create its January and February 2013 presentations to Dell’s Special 
Committee were based on August 2012 market data from IDC.13  Professor 
                                                            
13  Hubbard Report, ¶ 192. 
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Hubbard further asserts that between December 2012 (when the BCG projections 
were initially prepared) and the Appraisal Date, the market outlook for desktop and 
notebook PCs had deteriorated,14 a view that was not shared by either Silver 
Lake or Dell management as of August 2013 (when the Bank Case was 
created).15  To reflect this more pessimistic outlook, Professor Hubbard updated 
the August 2012 IDC forecast that BCG used in its Base Case model with the 
August 2013 IDC forecast.16  Interestingly, while Professor Hubbard quotes Mr. 
Gladden’s testimony about IDC (and Gartner) being slow in reacting to shifts and 
updating their forecasts, he omits Mr. Gladden’s testimony that Dell management 
“had a conclusion that even their short-term reporting wasn’t very accurate, let 
alone their forecasts.”17 
10.  The BCG forecasts that Professor Hubbard relied on used IDC 
forecast data.  According to the testimony of Mr. Ning, BCG’s representative, 
BCG had already updated their projections in January 2013 to take into account 
IDC’s updated forecast for PC shipments.18  Dell’s Special Committee did not ask 
                                                            
14  Hubbard Report, ¶ 192. 
15  Dell Exhibit 25 (Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), pp. 20-21 
(DELLE00779571-72). 
16  Hubbard Report, ¶ 192. 
17  Gladden Deposition, p. 79.  Mr. Gladden further testified that the relative 
inaccuracy of the industry forecasts was one reason the Company considered 
investing in developing “a proprietary model that we would own that would 
give us more capability and [sic] forecasting demand.” (Id.) 
18  Ning Deposition, pp. 195-196. 
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BCG to update its projections between J.P. Morgan’s and Evercore’s issuance of 
initial fairness opinions in February 2013 and their issuance of final fairness 
opinions in August 2013.19  Moreover, Dell management did not update the BCG 
projections to take into account the most recent PC industry forecasts as of the 
Appraisal Date.  Instead, they and Silver Lake prepared the Bank Case projections 
around the time of the August 2013 IDC forecast that Professor Hubbard used.20  
11. Further, Professor Hubbard’s downward adjustment of BCG’s Base 
Case to use IDC data that purportedly reflects “deterioration” in the PC industry 
appears to be inconsistent with Dell management’s and Silver Lake’s rejection of 
that more pessimistic view in the Bank Case.  The Bank Case projections could 
have reflected the IDC forecasts Professor Hubbard used had Dell management 
and Silver Lake thought it was reasonable to do so.  Instead, Dell and Silver Lake 
                                                            
19  See, e.g., Mandl Deposition, p. 151 (Mr. Mandl does not recall if the Special 
Committee asked BCG to update its projections before it rendered its final 
presentation for the fairness opinions).  See also Ning Deposition, pp. 172-73 
(BCG did not receive any more updates from Dell management on the 
productivity plan.) 
20  Silver Lake updated these projections in late August for its Rating Agency 
Presentation, and the forecasts were further refined in early October for 
purposes of E&Y’s 2013 ASC 805 analysis.   See Email from Kyle Paster to 
James Alejandro et al., September 4, 2013 (DELLE00733339); 
DELLE00733340.xlsx; Email from Jason Nies to Amber M. Price et al., 
October 10, 2013 (DELLE00734151); DELLE00734152.xlsx.   
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updated the Bank Case projections to reflect the stabilization and projected positive 
unit sales growth as shown in recent forecasts by both Gartner and IDC.21   
12. Professor Hubbard disregards this critical basis underlying the Bank 
Case projections and instead expresses concern that “they may have an upward, 
optimistic bias.”22  Although it is true that the forecast revenues in the Bank Case 
are higher overall than those shown in the BCG Base Case,23 the evidence I have 
described above suggests that the Bank Case projections reflect management’s best 
estimate of Dell’s future performance around the time of the Buyout Transaction.  
Consequently, any downward adjustment of revenue forecasts that were lower to 
begin with than the contemporaneous revenue forecasts in the Bank Case 
projections to reflect an even more negative view that was not shared by either the 
acquirers or Dell management is unreasonable and not supported by the evidence. 
13. Delaware Chancery Court opinions have expressed skepticism 
regarding post-transaction adjustments to management forecasts after consultation 
with the subject company’s management in conjunction with litigation, noting that 
such adjustments may reflect hindsight bias and the opinions of parties directly 
involved in the subject litigation who either have an interest in its outcome (i.e., 
                                                            
21  See, e.g., Silver Lake Partners, Project Denali, September 2013 (Durban Exhibit 
19), pp. 40-43.   
22  Hubbard Report, ¶ 178. 
23  Compare Cornell Report Exhibit 1A to Exhibit 2. 
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Dell management and Silver Lake) or who have been hired as litigation consultants 
to help those parties achieve a favorable outcome.24  For purposes of my analysis 
in this case, I used BCG’s Base Case revenue projections as created by BCG and 
approved by Dell’s Special Committee, took into account those cost savings that 
were actually in place and included in Dell’s business plan, and adjusted these 
projections consistent with Mr. Ning’s testimony regarding the appropriate level of 
projected cost savings given Dell’s actual progress in realizing those savings (and 
remaining within the range of probabilities presented to Dell’s Special committee 
by BCG).25  In addition, I used the Bank Case projections that were created shortly 
before the Appraisal Date by Silver Lake with input from Dell’s management and 
were presented to potential lenders to support financing during August and 
September 2013.  Dell’s and Silver Lake’s use of these projections to support 
                                                            
24  Owen v. Cannon, pp. 52-53 citing Agranoff v. Miller.  As former Vice 
Chancellor Strine noted in Agranoff v. Miller, “Suppose there was an interview 
with Sir George Martin from 1962 in which he opined as to how many number 
one songs he thought would be released by his new protégés, the Beatles.  
Could one fast-forward to 1971, interview Martin, and revise Martin’s earlier 
projection in some reliable way, recognizing that Martin would have known the 
correct answer as of that date? How could Martin provide information that 
would not be possibly influenced in some way by his knowledge of the actual 
success enjoyed by the Beatles and his recollection of his earlier projection?”  
(Agranoff v. Miller, p. 27.) 
25  BCG00013575.xls and JPM_0119609.xls; Ning Deposition, p. 269 (“If they 
had already achieved the 50% [cost savings], then it was reasonable to rely on 
50%”); Ning Exhibit 12 (Project Denali, Compendium of presented materials, 
February 5, 2013), p. 64 (DELL00002275). 
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financing indicates to me that they represented the acquirers’ (and Dell 
management’s) best estimate of the Company’s expected future performance as of 
the Appraisal Date.26  In short, the projections I used in my analyses represent 
either the best view of the Special Committee or of Dell management and Silver 
Lake regarding Dell’s expected future performance as of the Appraisal Date. 
14. In contrast, Professor Hubbard took the BCG Base Case and made 
after-the-fact downward adjustments that do not reflect either Dell management’s 
or the Special Committee’s views prior to the close of the Buyout Transaction.  
Moreover, the adjustments that Professor Hubbard made to purportedly reflect the 
updated IDC forecasts do not even match those forecasts in the interim years 
between 2012 and 2016.  Instead, Professor Hubbard altered the PC sales forecasts 
in the BCG Base Case to reflect the August 2013 IDC forecasts for the years 2012 
and 2016 and independently interpolated the projected annual sales between these 
two endpoints.27  Thus, he reinterpreted the August 2013 IDC forecasts to create 
                                                            
26  DELLE00734152.xls; Dell Rating Agency Presentation, April 2014 (Ning 
Exhibit 26) (DELLE00216698-216732).  As then-Vice Chancellor Strine 
observed in Delaware Open MRI Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Kessler, 
because it is a federal felony to knowingly obtain any funds from a financial 
institution by false or fraudulent pretenses or representations, projections that 
are provided to a financing source are typically given “great weight” by this 
Court.  Delaware Open MRI Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. Kessler, 2006 WL 
4764042, at *29 (Del. Ch. April 26, 2006).) 
27  See Hubbard Figures.xlsx, “IDC & Gartner” tab, Cells M2:T21 and Hubbard 




his own forecast and uses this self-created ex-post forecast to justify his lower 
estimate of Dell’s value.  Professor Hubbard’s substitution of his own forecasts for 
those that were accepted contemporaneously by parties to the transaction provides 
further evidence that he has created an entirely new set of projections after the fact 
based on key inputs that were not reviewed and approved by these parties.   
15. Professor Hubbard made similar downward “market” adjustments to 
the PC forecasts used in the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections even though 
the original Bank Case projections reflected Silver Lake’s and Dell management’s 
views shortly before the Transaction Date.28  He does not state which forecast he 
used in making these adjustments, but merely applied “modest adjustments as 
needed to reflect market conditions as of the Merger date that differed from those 
reflected in the spreadsheet” on the order of “less than one percent for desktops 
and less than three percent for notebooks as of FY2018.”29  Once again, Professor 
Hubbard made independent unsupported adjustments to contemporaneous 
projections that were created by the acquirers with input from Dell management, 
substituting his judgment for those parties and effectively creating his own set of 
projections.  And again, the end result is that Professor Hubbard has created an 
entirely new set of projections based on key inputs that were not approved by 
                                                            
28  Hubbard Bank Case DCF Model.xlsx, “Financials Control” tab, Cells F59:I59, 
F76:I76. 
29  Hubbard Report, ¶ 279. 
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Silver Lake or Dell management at the time of the transaction.  Consequently, both 
the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections 
are speculative and unreliable.  
B. Adjusted Attachment Rates 
16. Professor Hubbard also adjusted the attachment rates30 that were used 
to estimate the ratio of Support & Deployment (S&D) revenue as a function of the 
underlying hardware revenue in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections.31  
This change alone lowers his DCF valuation using the Hubbard Adjusted BCG 
Case by $0.96 per share. 
17. According to Professor Hubbard, the original BCG model used a fixed 
percentage to estimate S&D revenue for New Dell (Enterprise Services Group, 
Software, and Services).32  Professor Hubbard felt this approach was “no longer 
appropriate” due to the changes he made to update PC industry forecasts for Core 
Dell (End User Computing (i.e., the PC business) with attached software and 
services).33  Professor Hubbard, therefore, used the percentage of New Dell sales to 
                                                            
30  An attachment rate is a methodology used to forecast sales of complementary 
products in relation to sales of a primary product that involves determining the 
amount of complementary products that will be sold along with a given unit of 
primary product within a specified time period.   
31  Hubbard Report, ¶ 195.  Professor Hubbard did not update the attachment rates 
used in the Bank Case projections since those projections were prepared closer 
in time to the valuation date (¶ 279). 
32  Hubbard Report, ¶ 195. 
33  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 195-196. 
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estimated attached S&D revenue (17%) that had been used in the September 21 
Case developed by Dell management in the fall of 2012.34  However, Mr. Ning 
testified that Dell management provided the attachment rates BCG used in its 
January and February 2013 analyses based on Dell’s historical experience and that 
BCG did not make any independent determinations regarding these rates.35  The 
attachment rates imputed by BCG’s initial analysis range between 20.7 and 
21.1%.36 
18. Professor Hubbard does not explain why reverting back to Dell’s 
older, lower attachment rate projections is reasonable, especially given that Dell 
management provided BCG with updated attachment rate data after retaining BCG 
in November 2012.37  Nor does Professor Hubbard explain why he did not use the 
attachment rates directly forecasted in the Bank Case projections, which take 
account of the most recent forecast attachment rates.38  Consequently, Professor 
Hubbard’s adjustments to the attachment rates used in the BCG Base Case (i.e., 
                                                            
34  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 195-196. 
35  Ning Deposition, pp. 43-44.   
36  See Ning Exhibit 18 (BCG00013575.xlsx), Tab “New Denali model_BCG (2),” 
Cells E13:I13, E16:I16. 
37  Ning Deposition, pp. 22-23, 43-44.   
38  The Bank Case projections show a somewhat higher attachment rate percentage 
(17.9%) than the September 21 Case (17.0%).  See DELLE00734152.xlsx, Tab 
“S&P” and DELLE0093835.xlsm), at row 176 of “Details” Tab.  If Professor 
Hubbard had used the Bank Case attachment rate percentage in his BCG Case 




substituting an older, lower attachment rate forecast for a more recent, higher one) 
are unsupported by the evidence in this case and are therefore unreasonable. 
C. Five Year Extension of the Projections to Support Additional 
Required Investment and Assumed 2% Growth in Perpetuity 
19. Professor Hubbard’s adjusted projections added an additional five-
year transition period to the explicit forecast periods of the BCG Case and the 
Bank Case projections because he concluded that “Dell’s business would not be 
expected to achieve a steady state by the end of the initial BCG projection period 
in FY2017” due to industry changes and the fact that Dell was undergoing a 
transformation.39  Professor Hubbard notes that an extension period “allows key 
metrics such as growth rates, profit margins, and reinvestment rates to stabilize.”40   
20. Although I agree with the concept that an extension period may be 
reasonable in some situations, Professor Hubbard’s “extension” is inappropriate in 
this case given that, as he pointed out, Dell is a mature company with moderate 
growth prospects.41  In Dell’s case, normalized growth rates and margins can 
reasonably be modeled without extending the forecast period.  Further, Professor 
Hubbard does not use his “extension period” to trend towards normalized growth 
rates or margins.42  Instead, Professor Hubbard’s extension enables him to add 
                                                            
39  Hubbard Report, ¶ 200. 
40  Hubbard Report, ¶ 200. 
41  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 58, 62. 
42  Professor Hubbard instead assumed that the FY 2017 operating margin from the 
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sufficient additional investment that reduces Dell’s projected free cash flows in the 
explicit forecast period by an amount sufficient enough to offset the impact of his 
use of a 2% perpetuity growth rate in his terminal value calculation.  In particular, 
Revised Exhibit 1 shows that the additional reinvestment that Professor Hubbard 
adds to the extension period (FY 2018-2022) and the Terminal Period in the 
Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case model reduces his DCF valuation by $0.44 per share 
and $1.75 per share, respectively.  This additional investment more than offsets the 
valuation impact of his use of a higher perpetuity growth rate (2%) than I used in 
my (1%) terminal value calculation.43  As a result, Professor Hubbard’s “extension 
period” appears to be designed to lower the ultimate valuation of Dell while 
acknowledging that it is appropriate to assume a positive terminal growth rate.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case reflected a normalized margin and trended annual 
revenue growth rates between FY 2018 and 2022 such that his extended 
projections achieved his assumed 2% growth rate in perpetuity by the last year 
of his forecast period (FY 2022).  (Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 201-202, Exhibit 18.) 
43  Revised Exhibit 1 shows that the impact of lowering Professor Hubbard’s 
Perpetuity Growth Rate (“PGR”) from 2% to 1% decreases his DCF value by 
$1.32 per share in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case model.  Thus, the net 
impact of Professor Hubbard’s decision to extend the Hubbard Adjusted BCG 
Case projections beyond the explicit forecast period lowers his DCF valuation 
by $0.87 per share ($0.44 + $1.75 - $1.32). 
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Implied Terminal Growth Rate Assuming No Extension 
21. Exhibit 2A shows that Professor Hubbard’s calculated enterprise 
value of $26.049 billion in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case DCF model44 implies 
a free cash flow perpetuity growth rate (“PGR”) of -0.13% using his terminal value 
based on his free cash flow projection at the end of the BCG forecast period (FY 
2017).  Exhibit 2B shows that Professor Hubbard’s calculated enterprise value of 
$28.973 billion in the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case DCF model45 implies a free 
cash flow PGR of 1.08% (i.e., almost identical to my selected PGR of 1.0%) had 
he calculated his terminal value based on his free cash flow projection at the end of 
the Bank Case forecast period (FY 2018).   Thus, these exhibits show that 
Professor Hubbard could have arrived at his estimates of Dell’s fair value while 
using a PGR of 1% or lower without extending his adjusted projections beyond the 
explicit forecast period.   
22. Exhibits 2A and 2B further show that the Hubbard Adjusted BCG 
Case and Bank Case projections contained sufficient investment during the explicit 
forecast period to support the implied PGR resulting from Professor Hubbard’s 
valuation.  Thus there was no need for Professor Hubbard to extend his projections.  
As I demonstrate below, the BCG 50% Case and Bank Case with Cost Savings 
                                                            
44  Hubbard Report, Exhibit 18. 
45  Hubbard Report, Exhibit 24. 
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projections I used in my DCF valuation also contain sufficient reinvestment in 
order to support a 1.0% PGR at the end of the explicit forecast period.       
Dell’s Projections Do Not Require Additional Reinvestment 
23. In his DCF analyses using both the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and 
Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections, Professor Hubbard assumed a terminal 
growth rate of 2% instead of determining what stable growth rate was consistent 
with the growth rates reflected in the projections as I did.46  He concluded that 
funding this future growth would require additional annual investment during the 
terminal period using his “plowback” formula.  In particular, Professor Hubbard 
calculates required investment in a given year as the amount equal to the product 
of Dell’s projected annual operating profit47 during that period and his projected 
investment rate for Dell, which was Dell’s projected terminal growth rate (2%) 
divided by Dell’s expected return on invested capital (“ROIC”).48  He set Dell’s 
expected ROIC equal to his estimate of the Company’s WACC of 9.46%,49 which 
                                                            
46  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 217, 282; Cornell Report, ¶¶ 99-100. 
47  Professor Hubbard calculated Dell’s after-tax operating profit as “EBITAO 
[Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Amortization, and Option (stock-based 
compensation) Expense] less taxes on EBITAO minus the after-tax cost of 
stock-based compensation.”  (Hubbard Report, ¶ 211.) 
48  Hubbard Report, ¶ 211. 
49  Hubbard Report, ¶ 212. 
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implies that his required investment amounts would not generate any 
additional value for Dell.  There is no justification for doing this. 
24. Professor Hubbard then reduced his estimate of required annual 
investment by the amount of terminal period annual investment that was already 
incorporated into his model as projected capital expenditures, changes in net 
working capital, and acquisitions based on BCG’s assumptions.50  Finally, he 
assumed that Dell increased its investment amounts ratably each year over the 
transition period to reach the required investment calculation for FY 2023 (i.e., the 
terminal period) by the end of the transition period.51 
25. Professor Hubbard’s assumption that Dell’s expected ROIC equals its 
WACC underestimates the expected return on the Company’s investments because 
it assumes that they will not create any additional value beyond Dell’s cost of 
capital.  This runs directly counter to Dell’s expectations for its acquisitions, which 
were given a target internal rate of return (IRR) of 15% and thus assumes that these 
acquisitions would create additional value for Dell because this target hurdle rate 
was higher than Professor Hubbard’s estimate of Dell’s WACC.52  Because he 
underestimated Dell’s expected return on investment, he overestimated the 
                                                            
50  Hubbard Report, ¶ 213. 
51  Hubbard Report, ¶ 213. 
52  See Dell Ex. 28 (Bank Presentation), p. 8.   
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amounts that Dell would need to invest during the terminal period to achieve its 
terminal growth rate and therefore underestimated Dell’s cash flows during the 
terminal period. 
26. Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that Dell’s expected 
return on investment is equal to its WACC, I have determined that, given my 
WACC estimate of 9% and estimated perpetuity growth rate of 1%,53 no additional 
adjustments to projected investment amounts through acquisitions, capital 
expenditures, or changes in net working capital are necessary for either my Bank 
Case with Cost Savings or my BCG 50% Case scenario as shown in the Cornell 
Report because this scenario already includes sufficient investment amounts when 
I test it by applying Professor Hubbard’s formula.54 
27. When I apply Professor Hubbard’s reinvestment formula to my Bank 
Case with Cost Savings projections, I determined that the annual reinvestment 
amount required during the terminal period to sustain a terminal growth rate of 1% 
(my estimate) at an expected ROIC of 9.0% (my estimate of Dell’s WACC) is 
approximately $451 million (see Exhibit 3A).  However, the Bank Case with Cost 
                                                            
53  Cornell Report, ¶¶ 120.  
54  Because Professor Hubbard has estimated Dell’s perpetuity growth rate to be 
2% and its WACC to be 9.46%, (Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 217, 257), applying his 
formula to my projection scenarios and using his estimated WACC and 




Savings projections already assume that Dell would make $400 million per year in 
new acquisitions during the terminal period,55 and that Dell’s net working capital 
needs are $15 million per year in the terminal period.  Thus, Dell’s required annual 
additional investment during the terminal period would be $36 million before 
taking prior acquisitions and changes in net working capital into account.  
However, according to Dell’s FY 2013 10-K, the Company made $4.844 billion in 
acquisitions during that year and the Bank Case projected that Dell would make 
$400 million in acquisitions each year between FY 2014 and FY 2018, for a total 
of $6.844 billion in acquisitions.56  In addition, the Bank Case projections assumed 
that net working capital would increase by $527 million between FY 2013 and FY 
2018.57  The total required investment amount between FY 2013 and FY 2018 was 
$2.213 billion before taking projected acquisitions and increases in net working 
capital into account.  The implied lump sum additional investment necessary to 
sustain a 1% PGR at a 9.0% WACC as of the end of FY 2017 is $451 million,58 but 
                                                            
55  Cornell Report, Exhibit 11.  The Bank Case projections are already 
conservative with respect to reinvestment assumptions because they exclude 
expected incremental benefits to revenue and EBITDA from these projected 
acquisitions.  Dell Exhibit 25 (August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation), p. 54. 
56  Dell FY 2013 10-K, p. 65; Cornell Report, Exhibit 11. 
57  Cornell Report, Exhibit 11. 
58  I assume that the annual reinvestment amount grows by 1% each year during 
the terminal period consistent with my assumed growth in free cash flows.  
Using the Gordon Growth Model, the lump sum amount equals the annual 
required investment of $36 million divided by (9% WACC – 1% PGR). 
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the surplus investment amount (Acquisitions + Changes in Net Working Capital – 
Required Investment Amount) at that time was projected to be $5.158 billion, 
which is more than enough built-up investment to fulfill any additional investments 
required to sustain my projected perpetuity growth rate of 1%. 
28. When I apply the reinvestment formula to the BCG 50% Case 
projections, I determined that Dell’s required annual investment amount during the 
terminal period would be approximately $415 million.59  (See Exhibit 3B.)  
However, the BCG projections show Dell making $4.95 billion in additional 
acquisitions in FY 2013.60  In addition, net working capital was projected to 
increase by a net amount of $2.948 billion between FY 2013 and FY 2017.61  The 
total required investment amount between FY 2013 and FY 2017 for a 1% PGR is 
$1.844 billion before taking projected acquisitions and increases in net working 
capital into account.  The implied lump sum additional investment necessary to 
sustain a 1% PGR at a 9.0% WACC as of the end of FY 2017 is $5.188 billion,62 
but the surplus investment amount at that time was projected to be $6.055 billion, 
                                                            
59  Cornell Report, Exhibit 8. 
60  Cornell Report, Exhibit 8. 
61  Cornell Report, Exhibit 8. 
62  I assume that the annual reinvestment amount grows by 1% each year during 
the terminal period consistent with my assumed growth in free cash flows.  
Using the Gordon Growth Model, the lump sum amount equals the annual 
required investment of $415 million divided by (9% WACC – 1% PGR). 
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which is more than enough built-up investment to fulfill any additional investments 
required to sustain my projected perpetuity growth rate of 1%. 
29. Further, I have reviewed twelve DCF analyses that value Dell 
between May 24, 2012 and January 31, 2014 (see Exhibit 4).  None of these 
analyses include additional reinvestment amounts to sustain the growth implied by 
their terminal value calculation of Dell.  
30. Finally, as noted above, Delaware Chancery Court opinions have 
expressed skepticism regarding post-transaction adjustments to management 
forecasts made in the course of litigation since these adjustments may reflect 
hindsight bias and the opinions of parties who have an interest in the outcome of 
the litigation.63  By adding incremental investment amounts that were neither 
considered nor accepted by Dell management, Silver Lake, the Special Committee 
(or its financial advisors), or the financing banks, Professor Hubbard effectively 
substitutes his own judgment almost two years after the transaction close for the 
contemporaneous expectations of these insiders. 
D. Cost Savings from May Proxy 
31. The May Proxy disclosed BCG projections that reflected the impact of 
cost savings projections based on Dell’s ability to achieve 25% and 75% of Dell 
                                                            
63  Owen v. Cannon, pp. 52-53 (citing Agranoff v. Miller). 
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management’s goal of $3.3 billion in annual cost savings (“BCG 25% Case” and 
“BCG 75% Case” projections).64  These cost savings are reflected in the BCG 25% 
Case and BCG 75% Case DCF valuations used by the Special Committee’s 
advisors in their fairness opinion valuations.65  However, these are not the cost 
savings projections used by Professor Hubbard.  Instead, Professor Hubbard relied 
on cost savings projections contained in a tab within BCG’s valuation Excel 
model.66   
32. While Professor Hubbard characterizes his forecast as the “Adjusted 
BCG 25% Case,” the annual cost savings used by Professor Hubbard assume the 
cost savings phase in more quickly but plateau at a level lower than the cost 
savings associated with the BCG 25% Case as disclosed in the May Proxy, as set 
forth below (in millions).67   
Comparison of BCG “25%” Cost Savings 
     
     
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
     
     
Hubbard “25%” $200 $730 $780 $810 
BCG 25% in Proxy $84 $419 $838 $838 
     
Using the cost savings for the explicit forecast period shown in the May proxy 
would reduce Professor Hubbard’s estimate of Dell’s value by $0.12 (see Revised 
                                                            
64  May Proxy, pp. 100-101. 
65  May Proxy, pp. 67-68, 72, 78-79. 
66  Ning Exhibit 18 (BCG00013575.xlsx), Tab (“01-NCBM Minus”) at cells 
L45:O45. 
67  May Proxy, pp. 100-101. 
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Revised Exhibit 1).  Furthermore, Professor Hubbard’s extension of the 
projections (discussed in ¶¶ 19-20 above) inexplicably results in a decline in the 
cost savings of approximately $115 million by 2022.  In contrast, my BCG 50% 
Case assumes that Dell’s cost savings grow at Dell’s perpetuity growth rate (1% in 
my analysis) after the explicit forecast period.68   
33. Eliminating Professor Hubbard’s extension period and growing 
BCG’s cost savings by 1% during the terminal period would increase Professor 
Hubbard’s estimate by an additional $0.47 (see Revised Exhibit 1).  In Section 
IV, I discuss the impact of Professor Hubbard’s failure to take into account the full 
extent of Dell’s expected cost savings as reflected in the BCG 50% Case and Bank 
Case with Cost Savings projections.  
E. Professor Hubbard Erroneously Used Dell’s Marginal Tax Rate During 
the Terminal Period of His DCF Analyses, Incorrectly Assuming That 
Dell’s Offshore Cash Will Be Repatriated At That Rate 
34. In his DCF analysis, Professor Hubbard used two different tax rates.  
During his projection period, he used a tax rate of 18.5% as identified by Professor 
Shay, Dell’s tax expert.69  For his terminal period, he used Dell’s combined 
marginal tax rate (federal and state) of 35.8% under the assumption that “strategies 
that reduce current taxes are generally deferral strategies, not avoidance strategies, 
                                                            
68  Cornell Report, Exhibit 10. 
69  Hubbard Report,¶ 221. 
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and are generally not sustainable in perpetuity,” again relying on Professor Shay’s 
opinions.70  In contrast, I used a tax rate of 21% in both the forecast period and 
terminal period based on Dell management’s September 21 Projections.71 
35. The impact of using Dell’s marginal tax rate of 35.8% instead of 
18.5% in the terminal period is to reduce Dell’s implied equity value per share by 
$2.40 per share in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and by $2.82 in the Hubbard 
Adjusted Bank Case.  In contrast, the impact of using a cash tax rate of 18.5% in 
each year as opposed to the 21.0% tax rate projected by Dell management 
increases Dell’s implied equity value per share by $0.58 per share in the Hubbard 
Adjusted BCG Case and by $0.67 in the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case.  (See 
Revised Exhibit 1.) 
                                                            
70  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 222-223.  Professor Shay concluded that “deferral-based 
strategies are not sustainable in perpetuity” and that “even if a firm currently 
plays a lower than marginal rate, eventually marginal rates will have to be paid 
on earnings.” (Shay Report, ¶ 44)  He agreed with Professor Hubbard’s use of 
Dell’s combined marginal tax rate in the terminal period, stating that “it would 
be inappropriate to speculate about changes to future tax policy in the DCF 
valuation” and that using Dell’s then-current marginal tax rates was “consistent 
with behavior of investors and other business persons I have observed over 
many years.”  (Shay Report, ¶ 45)  
71  Cornell Report, Exhibits 10 & 11.  This is the same tax rate that the Special 
Committee’s advisors used in their DCF valuations.  See JPM_0003324.xlsm; 




36. Professor Hubbard’s assumption that a lower than marginal tax rate is 
“not sustainable in perpetuity” is inconsistent with Dell’s actual experience in 
effectively paying far lower tax rates over the last 25 years.  (See Exhibit 5.)  In 
the 25 years leading up to the Buyout Transaction, Dell’s effective tax rate was 
always significantly below the marginal rate.  Moreover, the effective tax rate was 
lower in more recent years, averaging 23.8% over the prior 10 years and 18.5% 
over the prior 3 years.  This is in spite of the fact that the marginal corporate tax 
rate has been at least 34% over that same time period.72 
37. Professor Hubbard’s assumption that Dell’s offshore cash will 
eventually need to be repatriated in a way that necessarily results in higher 
effective tax rates is not supported by the record.  Exhibit 6 shows that Dell paid 
significant amounts to repurchase stock (more than $36 billion) between FY 2000 
and FY 2013, made over $13.5 billion in acquisitions since FY 2000, and even 
began to pay dividends in FY 2013.  Further, as Professor Steines points out in his 
report, Dell repatriated almost $13 billion in cash between 2006 and 2013 without 
incurring a significant tax liability.73 Thus, I find no evidence to suggest that Dell 
                                                            
72  The top corporate tax rate was 34% in 1988-1992 and 35% since 1993. 
(http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=65) 
73  Expert Report of John P. Steines Jr., July 24, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Steines Report”), ¶ 7. 
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would pay tax at the statutory rate even if the Company repatriates its “offshore” 
cash. 
38. Even if Dell needed to access offshore cash in order to pay out 
dividends or repurchase stock, there is no evidence it would need to repatriate that 
cash in order to do so.  As a tax policy paper published by the Center for American 
Progress points out, “offshore” cash is not necessarily kept overseas physically.  It 
can be deposited in U.S. banks and even invested in U.S. projects so long as these 
projects are controlled by a non-U.S. subsidiary.74  “Repatriating” cash simply 
means bringing it under the control of a U.S. subsidiary rather than physically 
moving cash from overseas to the U.S.  For instance, as of May 2013, Apple had 
$102 billion in “permanently invested” overseas income that was not subject to 
U.S. taxation even though these funds were actually deposited in New York banks.  
These funds could be invested in U.S. projects or investments so long as they were 
not used to directly invest in Apple’s U.S. operations, pay dividends or repurchase 
shares.75  Apple has been able to access these funds by borrowing at very low 
interest rates and the debt issuances have carried maturities up to 30 years.76  
                                                            
74  Center for American Progress, “Offshore Corporate Profits:  The Only Thing 
Trapped is Tax Revenue,” Available online at < 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/tax-
reform/report/2014/01/09/81681/offshore-corporate-profits-the-only-thing-
trapped-is-tax-revenue/>, p. 4. 
75  Offshore Corporate Profits, p. 4. 
76  “Apple Shops Third Big Bond Offering - $5B – Since 2013 Amid Shareholder 
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Microsoft, Walmart, Du Pont, Coca-Cola, and Johnson & Johnson have all 
employed similar strategies in recent years to avoid having to repatriate cash.77 
39. Further, a study by Graham et al. (2012) provides additional support 
for the notion that repatriation of “offshore” cash is not a foregone conclusion.  
The authors point out that “if [foreign earnings] are never repatriated, then no U.S. 
taxes are ever paid.”78  If a company does not expect to repatriate earnings in the 
foreseeable future, it can defer the additional income tax expense in perpetuity.  
This deferral reduces the company’s effective tax rate because if the firm never 
repatriates, it never pays the U.S. taxes.79  When a company chooses not to 
repatriate earnings in the foreseeable future, these earnings are known as 
permanently reinvested earnings (PRE).  PRE can be very large for some 
multinational companies.  Graham et al. found that the aggregate PRE of the 50 
largest U.S. companies in 2008 totaled $610 billion.  Moreover, PRE has grown 
rapidly in recent years.  In 2008, 273 of the Fortune 500 companies reported some 
amount of PRE for a total of $1.03 trillion.  This represented a significant increase 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Plans,” Forbes, February 2, 2015.   
77  Offshore Corporate Profits, pp. 5-6.  Professor Steines describes additional 
strategies for tax-free repatriations in his report, including tax-free 
reorganizations involving affiliated companies and inversions.  Steines Report, 
¶¶ 21-25. 
78  Graham, John R., Jana S. Raedy, and Douglas A. Shackelford, “Research in 
Accounting for Income Taxes,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Volume 
43, 2012, p. 418. 
79  Graham et al., p. 418. 
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from the estimated aggregate PRE of $381 million in 2002 for 296 firms in the 
S&P 500.  Wunder (2009) found an average PRE of $3.74 billion per firm, which 
was more than seven times the $485 million mean reported by Krull (2004) in her 
study of Compustat firms in the 1990s.80 
40. This growth in permanently reinvested earnings is particularly 
noteworthy because an IRS study of the tax holiday provided by the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004 estimates that the holiday led to the repatriation of $362 
billion of foreign earnings.81  A 2009 article in The New York Times shows that 
Dell repatriated $4 billion during the tax holiday and used $2 billion to repurchase 
shares.82  On the other hand, because classifying earnings as PRE was one of the 
factors that determined the amount of foreign earnings that was subject to the Act’s 
favorable holiday rates, managers may be classifying as permanently reinvested 
earnings as much foreign profits as possible to maximize the amount of PRE, 
particularly if they believe that there will be future tax holidays or other rate 
reductions for foreign earnings.83  According to its FY 2013 10-K, Dell classified 
                                                            
80  Graham et al., p. 418. 
81  Graham et al., p. 418. 
82  “High and Low Finance – Tax Break for Profits Went Awry,” The New York 
Times, June 4, 2009.  Professor Steines points out in his report that Dell also 
repatriated approximately $8.8 billion through an internal restructuring “much 
or perhaps all of it without incurring residual U.S. tax.”  (Steines Report, ¶ 7). 
83  Graham et al., p. 418. 
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at least some of its earnings as PRE, 84 and Professor Hubbard notes that his 
estimated $6.3 million deferred tax liability associated with a hypothetical 
repatriation of Dell’s foreign earnings as of the Appraisal Date was identified by 
Dell as having been postponed “indefinitely.”85  
41. A leading valuation textbook further supports this notion, pointing out 
that “Multinational companies sometimes do not repatriate earnings (cash) back to 
their home country in order to defer taxation on that income. … [T]he tax a 
multinational company faces is often determined by its repatriation policy.  In this 
case, the accumulation of excess cash may create value for shareholders because of 
its interplay with the taxes the entity pays.”86   
42. Further, a company that wishes to repatriate cash may wait for tax 
holidays, which are government incentive programs that offer tax reduction or 
elimination to businesses.  In January 2015, Senators Rand Paul and Barbara Boxer 
proposed a 6.5% tax on repatriated funds provided those funds were used for 
initiatives like research and development, public-private partnerships, and 
                                                            
84  Dell FY 2013 10-K, p. 50 (“We have provided for the U.S. federal tax liability 
on these amounts for financial statement purposes, except for foreign earnings 
that are considered permanently reinvested outside of the U.S.”) 
85  Hubbard Report, ¶ 269; see also Shay Report, ¶ 48. 
86  Holthausen, Robert W., and Mark E. Zmjiewski, Corporate Valuation: Theory, 




acquisitions, and such funds could not be used for executive compensation or stock 
buybacks.87   
43. There are many economic benefits of tax holidays.88  A 2009 Decision 
Economics study concluded that lowering the tax on repatriated foreign income 
would inject $545 billion into the U.S. economy, stimulate 2010 real GDP by $110 
million, and result in 614,000 new jobs.  In addition, this study projected that the 
U.S. Treasury would receive an average of $28 billion annual revenue for five 
years that it otherwise would not have received.89  
44. Professor Hubbard selectively cites two valuation textbooks as 
support for his use of Dell’s marginal tax rate to calculate his terminal period cash 
flows.90 In one of those texts, the author (Professor Damodaran) concedes that his 
                                                            
87  “Two Senators Have Proposed a Tax Holiday Tech Companies Would Love,” 
Business Insider, January 29, 2015. 
88  See “Larry Kudlow’s Brilliant Idea for a Tax Holiday,” Motley Fool, October 
20, 2010; Larry Kudlow, “The economy could explode on the upside,” Real 
Clear Markets, October 6, 2010; Michelle Lodge, “Will a Tax Break for 
Multinationals Create Jobs?,” CNBC, July 28 2010; Allen Sinai, “A $545 
Billion Private Stimulus Plan,” The Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2009. 
89  Allen Sinai, “A $545 Billion Private Stimulus Plan,” The Wall Street Journal, 
January 28, 2009 
90  Damodaran (Investment Valuation, 3rd Ed.), asserts that using a marginal tax 
rate in calculating the terminal value is “good practice,” (p. 252) and Giri S. 
(Investment Banking: Concepts, Analysis, and Cases) relies on Damodaran in 
concluding that “[i]n measuring the FCFF [Free Cash Flow to the Firm] for the 
purpose of arriving at the terminal value … it is always the marginal tax rate 
that has to be used since all deferred tax assets get naturalized over a period of 
time and the company will eventually pay tax at the marginal rate.” (p. 218) 
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approach is “conservative” and that the tax effect of repatriating offshore cash is 
“not so clear in the long term” due to the potential for tax holidays and changes in 
the tax rate.91  Furthermore, other valuation textbooks dispute this practice.  For 
example, Valuation, 5th Edition, notes: “In actuality, many companies will never 
pay (or at least significantly delay paying) accrual-based taxes.  Consequently, a 
cash tax rate (one based on the operating taxes actually paid in cash to the 
government) represents value better than accrual-based taxes.”92  Elsewhere, it 
states: “Computing operating taxes by multiplying operating profit by the 
company’s statutory tax rate typically leads to an upward-biased estimate of 
operating taxes because it fails to recognize that foreign earnings are often taxed at 
different levels.”93  In my textbook, I maintain that the proper practice is to use 
estimated cash taxes in a DCF analysis.94   
45. Finally, none of the DCF valuations of Dell in the record use a 
marginal tax rate for the terminal value in their baseline valuations of Dell as a 
going concern, although some of the valuations did consider repatriation scenarios 
for sensitivity purposes.95  (See Exhibit 4.)   
                                                            
91  Investment Valuation, 3rd Ed., pp. 427-28. 
92  Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 536. 
93  Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 535. 
94  Cornell, Bradford, Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and 
Decision Making (“Corporate Valuation”), p. 113. 
95  J.P. Morgan and Evercore used marginal rates in their sensitivity analyses 
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F. Other Minor Differences Between Hubbard and Cornell Projections 
46. In addition to the adjustments I discuss above, Professor Hubbard’s 
and my DCF valuations differ slightly in their treatment of Dell’s projected stock-
based compensation (“SBC”) expense, depreciation and amortization expense, 
investment in net working capital, capital expenditures, restructuring charges, and 
the projections for the stub period of the FY 2014 projections between the 
valuation date and close of the fiscal year end in early 2015.   
Stock-Based Compensation and Incremental Opex 
47. In order to model the cash flow impact from Dell’s use of stock-based 
compensation, I adopt the method used by the Special Committee’s advisors and 
estimate FY 2014 to FY 2018 SBC expense of $362 million, which equals the 
actual SBC expense in FY 2012 and is identical to amounts projected for Dell in 
each of these years by the Special Committee’s advisors in the BCG cases in their 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
where they analyzed the effect on value of repatriating cash as part of the LBO 
transaction rather than the effect on Dell as a going concern public company.  In 
contrast, the advisors’ DCF valuation analyses of Dell as a going concern 
calculated the Company’s terminal value based on multiples of EBITDA but 
still explicitly showed the tax rate during the terminal period to be 21%.  
(Rajkovic Deposition, pp. 52-53; JPM_0003324.xlsm; JPM_0119609.xlsm; 
EVERCORE00004835.xlsm; EVERCORE00051053.xlsm.)  BCG used tax-
adjusted cash balances in its DCF analysis that was presented to Dell’s Board of 
Directors in January 2013 to reflect potential repatriation of offshore cash, but 
Mr. Ning testified that BCG did not perform any analysis to determine whether 
Dell, as a going concern, publicly-traded company would need to repatriate 
offshore cash.  (BCG00013575.xlsx (Ning Exhibit 18), “Value Range” Tab; 
Ning Deposition, p. 194.) 
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fairness opinion DCF valuations.96  I deduct SBC expense in arriving at the 
operating profit amount used to calculate Dell’s cash taxes in each year, thereby 
deducting an after-tax amount of $286 million in each year ($362 million 
multiplied by 1 less the 21.0% tax rate).97  Professor Hubbard uses this same SBC 
expense in his BCG 25% Case model but applies a different tax rate such that his 
after-tax deduction is $243 million in FY 2015 – 2017.  He then models SBC 
expense as a constant percentage of FY 2017 Revenues beyond FY 2018, which 
results in lower after-tax SBC expense in each year than I project.98  Had Professor 
Hubbard instead used my estimate of after-tax SBC expense, his DCF valuations 
would have been lower by $0.39 per share in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case 
model and by $0.10 per share in the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case model.  (See 
Revised Exhibit 1.) 
48. In the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case model, Professor Hubbard 
includes both Incremental Opex and SBC expense.99  The Incremental Opex 
amount is what is referred to in the September 2013 Silver Lake presentation as 
                                                            
96  Silver Lake Partners, Project Denali, September 2013, (Durban Exhibit 19), p. 
13; JPM_0013172.xlsm, tab: “PL”; EVERCORE00004835.xlsm, tab: “BCG 
Total”; and Dell 2012 10-K, p. 61.   
97  See, e.g., Cornell Report, Exhibits 1E & 10 for BCG 50% Case projections and 
DCF valuation. 
98  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 198-199, fn 257; Hubbard Report, Exhibit 18.   
99  Hubbard Bank Case DCF Model.xlsx, “Opex” tab, cells J33:N33, S33:W33. 
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Incremental Cash LTI (i.e., long-term incentives).100  As Silver Lake’s presentation 
points out, the Bank Case includes Incremental Cash LTI expense as a private 
company replacement for SBC expense.101  In my Bank Case with Cost Savings 
scenario, I remove Incremental Cash LTI as a private company expense to avoid 
this double-counting and instead include management’s projections for Dell’s SBC 
expense as a publicly traded company.102  Had Professor Hubbard excluded the 
Incremental Opex amount from his Adjusted Bank Case projections, his estimate 
of Dell’s value would increase by $1.24 per share.  (See Revised Exhibit 1.) 
Other Differences 
49. In his Adjusted Bank Case Projections, Professor Hubbard also 
includes after-tax restructuring expense that Silver Lake described as “ongoing 
business rationalization and cost initiatives.”103  I did not include these payments in 
my estimate of Dell’s fair value on a going concern basis because the cost savings 
in the Bank Case projections were based on $3.6 billion of specifically-identified 
initiatives that were already in place at the time the projections were created.104  
                                                            
100
  Project Denali, September 2013, p. 13. 
101
  Project Denali, September 2013, p. 13 (“$275 million annual incremental cash 
LTI granted in FY 2014E to reflect private company compensation plan; 
incremental to converted RSUs to cash awards”). 
102  Cornell Report, fn. 237. 
103  Hubbard Bank Case DCF Model.xlsx, “DCF Control” tab, Cells G102:K102; 
Dell Exhibit 25 (August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation), p. 54. 
104  Dell Exhibit 25 (August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation), pp. 26-27. 
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However, as Michael Dell’s testimony makes clear, not all of Dell’s cost savings 
initiatives were reflected in the Bank Case.  Rather, Silver Lake modeled several 
billion dollars in cost reduction and savings in addition to the $3.6 billion shown in 
the Bank Case.105  Further, neither Silver Lake’s representative nor Dell 
management testified that restructuring costs were part of Dell’s ongoing 
operations had the company not gone private, nor were these costs shown as part of 
the Bank Case operating projections shown in the Dell’s Rating Agency 
Presentation.106  Thus, I believe it is appropriate to exclude these costs in 
estimating Dell’s fair going concern value based on the Bank Case with Cost 
Savings projections.107  
50. Revised Exhibit 1 also shows the aggregate valuation effect of small 
changes between Professor Hubbard’s valuation conclusion using his Adjusted 
BCG Case projections and my DCF valuation using the BCG 50% Case 
projections due to differences in our projections of Dell’s depreciation and 
amortization expense ($0.15 per share), investment in net working capital ($0.20 
                                                            
105  Dell Deposition, pp. 217-220. 
106 Dell Exhibit 25 (August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation), p. 55. 
107 If the Court decides that such costs should be included in estimating Dell’s fair 
value as a publicly traded company, my concluded value of Dell based on my 
DCF valuation using the Bank Case with Cost Savings projections would 
decrease by $0.28 per share (see Revised Exhibit 1) and my overall concluded 
value, which is based on a 50% weighting of the results of the Bank Case with 
Cost Savings DCF valuation, would decrease by $0.14 per share. 
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per share), and capital expenditures (-$0.23 per share).108  Finally, Revised Exhibit 
1 shows that Professor Hubbard’s DCF value per share would be $0.05 per share 
lower had he assumed the same percentage of annual cash flows allocated to the 
Q4 FY 2014 stub period to account for the period between the valuation date and 
close of the fiscal year end in early 2015. 
IV. PROFESSOR HUBBARD IMPROPERLY IGNORES THE IMPACT 
OF DELL’S EXPECTED COST SAVINGS 
51. In selecting the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and Hubbard Adjusted 
Bank Case forecasts as the basis for his valuation of Dell, Professor Hubbard fails 
to take account of cost savings that Dell had already realized prior to the 
transaction.  By doing so, his Adjusted BCG Case forecast underestimates Dell’s 
value by $3.52 per share and his Bank Case forecast underestimates Dell’s value 
by $4.20 per share (see Revised Exhibit 1). 
52. I used versions of the BCG and Bank Case projections, but which 
appropriately incorporated the extent of the cost savings plans in place, in arriving 
at my estimate of Dell’s fair value as of the Appraisal Date.  As I explain below, 
my decision to use the BCG 50% Case and Bank Case with Cost Savings 
                                                            
108  These differences arise due to the different treatment in modeling these line 
items in my forecast (i.e., by using the advisors’ forecasts for the explicit 
forecast period and by growing at the 1% PGR in the terminal period) compared 
to Professor Hubbard’s use of the BCG balance sheet projections for Property 
& Equipment and Net Working Capital.  
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projections is supported by evidence in the record regarding Dell’s success in 
implementing its cost savings initiatives at a pace that far exceeds that 
contemplated in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections. 
A. Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case Projections 
53. In creating the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections, Professor 
Hubbard fails to take into account evidence in the record that, at the time of the 
transaction, Dell had achieved approximately 50% of the forecasted cost savings at 
a faster pace than was originally forecast.  As I noted in the Cornell Report, there is 
ample evidence in the record regarding the implementation of the cost savings 
initiatives and its impact on actual results during Dell’s fiscal year (“FY”) 2014 to 
support the conclusion that Dell could reasonably be expected to achieve at least 
50% of its projected costs savings as of the Appraisal Date.109   
54. In particular, Dell significantly exceeded the planned cost savings for 
FY 2014 of $84 million in the BCG 25% Case and $168 million in the BCG 50% 
Case,110 having realized $1.6 billion in these savings in that year, with another $1.5 
billion expected to be realized in FY 2015.111  And BCG’s representative Lutao 
Ning acknowledged in his deposition that BCG’s Base Case should be 
                                                            
109  Cornell Report, ¶¶ 43, 45, 57. 
110  Cornell Report, Exhibit 1B (referencing JPM_0119609.xls; tab BCG-Total). 
111  Dell Rating Agency Presentation, April 2014 (Ning Exhibit 26), p. 19.  
(DELLE00216698-216732 at 216702.) 
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supplemented with the cost savings actually achieved, an amount that 
approximated BCG’s 50% Case.112  As I noted in the Cornell Report, Dell was on a 
pace to exceed even the rate of annual cost savings shown in the BCG Case, which 
forecast $251 million in FY 2014 and $1.3 billion in FY 2015.113  Further, Michael 
Dell has admitted that at least some of the cost savings contributed to Dell’s better-
than-expected post-transaction performance.114 
B. Bank Case Projections 
55. Professor Hubbard downplays the relevance of the Bank Case 
projections by claiming that they contain elements of private company savings 
(e.g., lower investment in working capital) and are overly optimistic.115  This 
conclusion ignores Mr. Gladden’s testimony that the Bank Case projections were 
informed by Silver Lake’s due diligence process and that he and his team reviewed 
and agreed with the key assumptions underlying the projections at the time they 
were created.116   
56. Further, Professor Hubbard does not cite any evidence to support his 
conclusion that the Bank Case includes private company savings.  To the contrary, 
                                                            
112  Ning Deposition, p. 269 (“Q:  …  So would it have been reasonable to rely on 
the 25% forecast?  A:  It could have been – it was reasonable to rely on – if they 
had already achieved the 50%, then it was reasonable to rely on 50%.”). 
113 Cornell Report, ¶ 45, Exhibit 1B. 
114  Dell Deposition, p. 310. 
115  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 178-79. 
116  Gladden Deposition, pp. 232-237, 240-241.  
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the August 2013 ratings agency presentation gives a detailed account of the 
strategies Michael Dell and Silver Lake intended to pursue for Dell as a private 
company.117  Every one of these strategies (gain PC and server market share, more 
aggressively targeting certain commercial accounts, investing in sales coverage 
and integrated solutions for mid-market customers, and developing localized 
products and solutions and enhancing go-to market capabilities in emerging 
markets)118 was possible for Dell to implement as a public company,119 and the 
Bank Case projections included in the presentation already take account of these 
strategies.120  Professor Hubbard does not provide any supporting evidence to show 
which savings were possible as a private company as opposed to a public one.  In 
general, the most significant cost savings brought about by going private is the 
avoidance of regulatory filing and reporting costs.121  I’ve found no evidence in the 
record that such a savings would impact Dell’s cash flows in a material way.122 
                                                            
117  Dell Exhibit 25 (Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), p. 29. 
118  Dell Exhibit 25 (Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), p. 29. 
119  See Durban Deposition, pp. 170-178; see, also, Dell Deposition, pp. 155-156. 
120  Dell Exhibit 25 (Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), p. 55 
121  See Amihud, Yacov, “The Characteristics and Effects of Management 
Buyouts,” in Leveraged Management Buyouts: Causes and Consequences, 
edited by Yacov Amihud, Beard Books, 2002, p. 25. 
122  For example, the August 2013 Rating Agency did not show filing and reporting 
costs in its detailed breakdown of the cost savings.  (Dell Exhibit 25, pp. 26-




57. In contrast with Professor Hubbard’s claims that the Bank Case 
projections contain much lower expense levels, Exhibit 7 demonstrates that 
Corporate General & Administrative Expense as a percentage of Revenues in the 
Bank Case and Bank Case with Cost Savings projections are not materially lower 
than Dell experienced in FY 2009 – 2013.  Similarly, Dell’s projected EBITDA 
margin in the Bank Case is in line with Dell’s actual experience during FY 2009 – 
2013 and is projected to be only slightly higher in FY 2017 – 2018 when 
incremental cost savings are taken into account.  Exhibit 8 demonstrates that while 
the Bank Case projects lower net working capital investment than either the 
September 21 or BCG Case projections, total net reinvestment is projected to be 
higher than the BCG Base Case in FY 2015, 2016, 2018 and is also projected to be 
higher than the September 21 Case in FY 2017 and 2018. 
58. Professor Hubbard also ignores the $1 billion in incremental cost 
savings included in the Bank Case projections even though he has not provided any 
evidence that these cost savings could not be achieved by Dell as a going concern, 
public company.123  And, in fact, they are the same type of cost savings that 
management was in the process of implementing prior to the transaction.124  Dell’s 
management provided Silver Lake with the information used to describe the cost 
                                                            
123  Durban Deposition, pp. 309-312; Dell Deposition, pp. 216-217, 259-261; and 
Gladden Deposition, pp. 247-249. 
124  Cornell Report, ¶ 80. 
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reduction opportunities included in the August 2013 Rating Agency 
Presentation.125  This presentation showed initiatives that were expected to result in 
$3.6 billion in annual productivity cost savings in order to maintain and improve 
competitive positioning.126  These additional cost savings are shown in a 
September 2013 Silver Lake Presentation as incremental cost savings of $500 
million in FY 2015 and $1 billion in each of the years FY 2016-2018.127  As noted 
above, Dell actually exceeded the planned cost savings for FY 2014, having 
realized $1.6 billion of these savings in that year, with another $1.5 billion in cost 
savings expected in 2015.128 
59. Exhibit 9 presents an analysis of EBITDA margins in BCG 25% 
Case, BCG 50% Case, Bank Case, and Bank Case with Cost Savings projections.  
The exhibit demonstrates that the Bank Case with Cost Savings projections start 
out below those for both BCG cases in FY 2014 and 2015, but increase over time 
such that they fall in between those projected by the BCG 25% Case and BCG 
50% Case in FY 2016 and 2017.  In contrast, the Bank Case projections that 
Professor Hubbard further adjusts downward do not rebound to the level of margin 
                                                            
125  August 2013 Rating Agency Presentation (Gladden Exhibit 28), p. 26 
(DELL00024949); Gladden Deposition, pp. 240-241. 
126  Gladden Exhibit 28, pp. 26-27. 
127  Silver Lake Partners, Project Denali, September 2013, (Durban Exhibit 19), p. 
13. 
128  Dell Rating Agency Presentation, April 2014 (Ning Exhibit 26), p. 19.  
(DELLE00216698-216732 at 216702.) 
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projected in the BCG case projections until FY 2017.  As I discussed above and in 
the Cornell Report, the failure to incorporate the impact of these projected cost 
savings in a forecast for purposes of valuing Dell is inconsistent with the record 
evidence as of the Appraisal Date. 
V. PROFESSOR HUBBARD’S NON-OPERATING ASSET AND 
LIABILITY ADJUSTMENTS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER 
VALUATIONS IN THE RECORD   
60. In this section, I analyze differences between Professor Hubbard’s and 
my assumptions regarding the proper adjustments to make to Dell’s estimated 
enterprise value (i.e., the value of its operating assets) in order to arrive at an 
estimate of Dell’s equity value.129  In particular, Professor Hubbard and I use 
different estimates of Dell’s Net Debt (i.e., Cash less Total Debt) as of the 
                                                            
129  Professor Hubbard also used a different method of estimating Dell’s diluted 
shares outstanding.  In particular, he used Dell’s shares outstanding as of 
August 22, 2013 of 1.758 million and added an additional 7 million shares to 
reflect the reported impact of dilution from options, restricted stock units and 
shares for the three month period ended August 2, 2013 from Dell’s 2Q FY 
2014 Form 10-Q filing.  (Hubbard Report, ¶ 272.)  In contrast, I started with the 
same basic shares outstanding but used detail on the exercise prices and vesting 
schedules for the outstanding options and restricted stock units and shares to 
estimate the impact of dilution relative to my concluded equity value per share.  
(Cornell Report, fn. 277.)  Professor Hubbard’s approach is approximately 
correct (and in his case overstates dilution) because his valuation is lower than 
the transaction price (which approximates the Dell stock price that the 
Company would have used to estimate dilution for financial accounting 
purposes).  My approach is more precise and allows me to estimate dilution for 
fair value conclusions that differ materially from Dell’s actual stock price. 
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Appraisal Date.  Moreover, Professor Hubbard inappropriately omits $5 billion in 
cash from Dell’s total cash balance and deducts approximately $5 billion in net tax 
liabilities.  Taken together, these adjustments underestimate Professor Hubbard’s 
estimate of Dell’s fair value using the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections by 
$5.59 per share and using the Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case by $5.60 per share (see 
Revised Exhibit 1).  
A. Professor Hubbard Improperly Omits $5 Billion in “Required” Cash 
from his Valuation 
61. Professor Hubbard states that “[i]f a firm has more cash than is 
necessary for its ongoing operations, the excess cash is a valuable non-operating 
asset of the firm and should be added to the DCF valuation” and concludes that 
“Dell had more cash on the Merger date than it required for its ongoing 
operations.”130  Professor Hubbard relied upon the August 2013 Rating Agency 
Presentation and Dell’s post-transaction cash balance to conclude that Dell 
required approximately $5 billion in cash to fund its ongoing operations.131  He 
then deducted this $5 billion amount from his estimate of Dell’s cash balance of 
$11.04 billion as of October 29, 2013 to arrive at excess cash of $6.04 billion.132  
Professor Hubbard’s methodology has the effect of lowering his implied per share 
                                                            
130  Hubbard Report, ¶ 261. 
131  Hubbard Report, ¶ 262. 
132  Hubbard Report, ¶ 263. 
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equity value by $2.83 per share ($5.0 billion divided by 1.765 million diluted 
shares outstanding).133  (See Revised Exhibit 1.) 
62. The amount of excess cash a company holds depends on the nature of 
the underlying business.  As Professor Damodaran points out, there are certain 
types of businesses, such as a small retail firm that engages in a lot of cash 
transactions, which may require a substantial operating cash balance.134  Other 
businesses, such as a manufacturing company in a developed market, may not need 
any operating cash.  Operating cash should be viewed as part of a company’s 
working capital requirements, and any excess cash and near-cash investments can 
be added to the value of the company’s operating assets.  As I have described in 
the Cornell Report,135 Dell is a long-established global company with extensive 
worldwide manufacturing operations, such that it is reasonable to conclude that 
Dell’s operating cash needs are already accounted for in the working capital 
forecasts that are part of its cash flow projections.136   
                                                            
133  Hubbard Report, ¶ 272. 
134  Investment Valuation, 3rd Ed., pp. 423-424. 
135  Cornell Report, ¶¶ 10-13, 39-40. 
136  Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 137. (“Operating working capital equals operating current 
assets minus operating current liabilities.  Operating current assets comprise all 
current assets necessary for the operation of the business, including working 
cash balances, trade accounts receivable, inventory and prepaid expenses.”) 
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63. Thus, Professor Hubbard appears to be double-counting Dell’s cash 
requirements.  Both the BCG Base Case and Bank Case projections show that 
Dell’s working capital needs (including operating cash) were projected to increase 
over time as the Company carried out its business plan.137  This projected increase 
in net working capital is shown as an offset to free cash flow.  Both the BCG and 
Bank Case projections used by Professor Hubbard include projected changes in 
working capital, and Professor Hubbard does not provide any evidence that these 
projections did not include projected cash used in Dell’s operations.  In fact, the 
support that Professor Hubbard relies on for concluding that Dell’s excess cash 
balance is only $6 billion does not consider Dell’s working capital forecasts at all 
and does not support his implicit assertion that additional amounts beyond Dell’s 
forecasted working capital needs should be deducted from Dell’s cash balance.138  
Rather, the BCG Base Case projections used by Professor Hubbard in his analysis 
directly contradict this assertion because the BCG DCF analyses add total cash 
rather than excess cash to arrive at Dell’s equity value.139  
                                                            
137 BCG00013575.xlsx (Ning Exhibit 18), “Total Base” tab; DELLE00734152.xls, 
“Consolidated” tab. 
138  Denali Acquiror Inc., Rating Agency Presentation, p. 38 (DELLE00381224); 
LBO Project Update, Treasury Ops, September 3, 2013, p. 12 
(DELLE00382674). 
139  See BCG00013575.xlsx (Ning Exhibit 18), “Value Range” tab. 
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64. Using a company’s total cash and marketable securities to calculate 
firm value from enterprise value is a commonly accepted procedure.  For example, 
a leading valuation textbook states that “[o]nce you value the operating assets, you 
can add the value of the cash and marketable securities to arrive at firm value…”140  
Another textbook states that “[t]o value the firm, we add the value of all of the cash 
and marketable securities to the enterprise value,”141 and a leading investment 
banking text confirms this relationship.142 
65. To examine whether Professor Hubbard’s methodology of adding 
excess cash to a company’s enterprise value is a commonly accepted practice, I 
reviewed twelve sets of DCF analyses which value Dell between May 24, 2012 
and January 31, 2014 (see Exhibit 4).  Not surprisingly, the vast majority of these 
analyses used total cash rather than excess cash in calculating firm value.143  In 
                                                            
140  Damodaran, Aswath, Investment Valuation, 3rd Ed., John Wiley & Sons, 2012, 
p. 425. 
141  Holthausen, Robert W. and Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation: Theory, 
Evidence & Practice First Edition: Cambridge Business Publishers (2014), p. 
564 
142  Rosenbaum, Joshua and Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking: Valuation, 
Leveraged Buyouts and Mergers & Acquisitions, Second Ed., John Wiley & 
Sons, 2013, p. 35.  
143  Three of these analyses (Morgan Stanley, Citi, Morningstar, and the Houlihan 
Lokey October 2013 Solvency Presentation) do not include long-term 
investments in calculating the total cash balance as I do.  However, my 
inclusion of long-term investments is an appropriate addition to enterprise value 
in calculating a company’s equity value per share since neither interest income 




fact, only one analysis, an Ernst & Young ASC 805 valuation, takes excess cash 
into account, and this was a purchase price allocation analysis for financial 
reporting purposes that did not purport to independently value Dell.144  Even so, 
the total cash adjustments made by Ernst & Young are significantly less than those 
proposed by Professor Hubbard.145  My review of these valuations confirms that 
adding total cash to enterprise value is commonly accepted practice. 
B. Professor Hubbard Improperly Understates Dell’s Net Cash as a Going 
Concern as of the Appraisal Date by Including Transaction-Related 
Items 
66. Professor Hubbard and I also used different estimates of Dell’s net 
cash balance as of the Appraisal Date.146  In my analysis, I use Dell’s adjusted 
October 29, 2013 total cash of $12.469 billion and total debt of $6.311 billion to 
arrive at net cash of $6.158 billion.147  Professor Hubbard estimated Dell’s total net 
cash to be $5.986 billion ($11.04 billion cash less $5.054 billion in debt).148  
                                                            
144  Dell Inc. ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, 
DELLE00733762-4129 at 4117.  According to ASC 805, the purpose of such a 
valuation is to allocate the purchase consideration paid among various balance 
sheet items (assets and liabilities) for financial reporting and tax purposes  
(ASC 805-740-25-6).   
145  Ernst & Young’s analysis adds $1.19 billion in “illiquid” cash and another $765 
million in “excess” cash. See Ernst & Young ASC 805 Valuation Analysis 
(DELLE00734117). 
146  Because any differences in a company’s total cash and total debt balances could 
arise due to paying off debt, it is more appropriate to look at a company’s net 
cash (or net debt, if debt exceeds cash) balance instead. 
147  Cornell Report, Appendix G. 
148  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 261, 264 and Exhibit 21.  This amount does not take into 
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Professor Hubbard’s lower net cash estimate (by $0.72 billion) results in his 
implied equity value per share being lower than mine by $0.10 per share.149  (See 
Revised Exhibit 1.) 
67. In order to accurately measure Dell’s going concern net cash levels as 
of the Appraisal Date (i.e., the level of net cash Dell would have had as of the 
Appraisal Date had the Buyout Transaction not taken place), it is necessary to 
exclude items such as redemption of investments and cash transfers into escrow 
accounts that took place between August 2150 and October 29, 2013 since these 
items would not have taken place absent the Transaction and impact the net cash 
position (i.e., do not involve an equal reduction in cash and debt balances).151  As a 
result, I adjusted Professor Hubbard’s October 29, 2013 debt amount of $5.054 
billion by adding back $1.506 billion in transaction-related debt repayments and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
account Professor Hubbard’s estimate of cash used in Dell’s operations of 
“approximately $5 billion,” which would reduce his net cash balance to $0.986 
billion.  (Hubbard Report, p. 134.) 
149  Hubbard Report, ¶ 272 (based on his 1.765 million diluted shares outstanding). 
150  August 2, 2013 is the end of Dell’s second quarter of fiscal 2014.  See Dell Inc., 
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended August 2, 2013 (“Dell Inc. 2Q FY 2014 10-
Q”). 
151  Both Professor Hubbard’s debt and cash amounts are understated because he 
improperly deducts a transaction-related repayment of approximately $1.3 
billion in structured finance debt.  (Denali Holding Inc. Quarterly Report, 
November 1, 2014 (DELLE00292678-720), p. 24.)  However, this repayment 
should have no impact on net cash since it results in a decrease to both cash and 
debt of approximately $1.3 billion. 
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deducting $249 million in transaction-related debt proceeds.152  Similarly, I added 
back $172 million in transaction-related cash expenditures along with the $1.506 
billion in transaction-related debt repayments and deducting the $249 million in 
transaction-related proceeds from debt issuances from Dell’s cash balance as of 
October 28, 2013.  (See Revised Exhibit 10.)  
C. Professor Hubbard Improperly Adjusts Dell’s Fair Value for Potential 
Tax Assets and Liabilities 
FIN 48 Liability 
68. In his report, Professor Hubbard reduces his estimate of Dell’s 
enterprise value by $3.01 billion to ostensibly take into account a potential tax 
liability reflected in Dell’s financial statements as of the Appraisal Date.153  
Professor Hubbard’s inclusion of the FIN 48 liability reduces his implied per share 
equity value by $1.71 per share in both his BCG 25% Case and his Bank Case 
scenarios.  (See Revised Exhibit 1.)  To support this adjustment, he states that 
“[i]n addition to debt, other debt-like liabilities not related to the ongoing 
operations of the company should be subtracted from the DCF value” and that 
Dell’s historical financial statements show a very large liability related to past tax 
returns in various countries.154  Although I agree, as a general proposition, that a 
                                                            
152 See Cornell Report, ¶ 113 and Appendix G. 
153  Hubbard Report, ¶ 267. 
154  Hubbard Report, ¶ 265.   
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company’s non-operating liabilities should be subtracted from its DCF value to the 
extent they reflect additional cash outflows that are not reflected in the DCF 
analysis, I disagree with Professor Hubbard’s implicit conclusion that FIN 48 
provides a reliable measure of Dell’s potential future tax liability that is not already 
taken into account by the estimates of projected cash taxes shown in the BCG Base 
Case and Bank Case cash flow projections. 
69.  According to FASB Interpretation No. 48 (“FIN 48”), companies 
must establish a contingent liability on their balance sheets for potential future tax 
payments, i.e., taxes that might have to be paid in the future.155  Professor Hubbard 
acknowledges that FIN 48 liability is “a measure of the expected tax payments 
associated with tax positions that the company may lose if it is challenged by the 
tax authority.”156  These expected tax payments represent the difference between 
tax positions recognized on a company’s tax return and those recognized on its 
income statement for financial reporting purposes (i.e., using accrual accounting) 
                                                            
155  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 265-266.  Professor Shay agrees with Professor Hubbard’s 
treatment.  (Shay Report, ¶ 62.) 
156  Hubbard Report, ¶ 266 (emphasis added).  According to the FASB’s Summary 
of Interpretation No. 48, this recorded amount is an estimate of the total amount 
at risk given a determination that the risk of not owing this amount is not more 




and do not take into account the likelihood or effects of possible settlement with 
taxing authorities. 157     
70. Further, Professor Hubbard does not cite any valuation texts to 
support his inclusion of the FIN 48 liability in calculating Dell’s equity value.  
None of the major valuation texts I have reviewed suggest reducing a company’s 
enterprise value by its unadjusted FIN 48 liability.  In addition, only three of the 
twelve valuations of Dell in the record (the Ernst & Young ASC 805 purchase 
allocation valuation and the Houlihan Lokey October 2013 and January 31, 2014 
valuations) include offsets for tax liabilities (see Exhibit 4).  Each of these three 
valuations of Dell was performed for financial accounting purposes, not to 
determine Dell’s independent, fair value as a going concern.158  Thus, I believe it is 
                                                            
157  Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Interpretation No. 48: 
Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, (hereinafter referred to as “FIN 
48”), Appendix A, p. 17. 
158  These valuations make several non-standard adjustments.  For example, the 
Ernst &Young valuation adds the value of the Dell trade name and DFS’ 
receivables as additional assets and subtracts additional net working capital 
beyond that shown in the cash flow forecasts and FIN 48 liability.  E&Y’s use 
of these adjustments may be appropriate in an ASC 805 valuation used to 
allocate the purchase price of an acquired company amount various balance 
sheet items, but in my experience these are not standard adjustments for 
purposes of arriving at an independent estimate of a company’s intrinsic value.  
(DELLE00733762-4129 at 4117; ASC 805-740-25-6.)  The two Houlihan 
Lokey valuations show Dell’s estimate of between $800 and $850 million 
(October 2013) and between $835 and $865 million (January 31, 2014) for “tax 
and legal expenses” but do not provide any further detail as to the breakdown 
between these categories.  (Dell Inc., Discussion Materials, October 2013, p. 13 
(DELLE00780000) and Denali Holdings, Inc., Valuation Analysis as of January 
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inappropriate to rely on these valuations in determining whether a FIN 48 liability 
should be deducted from Dell’s enterprise value.159   
71. Moreover, a FIN 48 liability is measured by comparing projected cash 
tax expense under a worst case scenario with accrual-based tax expense recorded 
in that company’s financial statements.160  It does not measure the extent to which 
a given set of cash flow projections may or may not understate projected cash tax 
expense.  As such, it is irrelevant in a DCF valuation context and should not be 
used to adjust projected cash taxes paid as shown in a set of cash flow projections.   
72.   I therefore conclude that the inclusion of a FIN 48 liability is 
speculative and inconsistent with standard practices of valuing companies on a 
going concern, fair value basis.   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
31, 2014, p. 3.) 
159  Moreover, the $3 billion FIN 48 liability used by Professor Hubbard is far in 
excess of the $800-$850M in “estimated exposure of certain tax and legal 
claims” that Houlihan Lokey assumed as contingent liabilities in its October 
2013 solvency opinion (i.e., a valuation done for financial accounting purposes 
rather than for the purpose of determining Dell’s intrinsic value).  
(DELLE00779987 at p. 11.)  I note that the Houlihan Lokey valuations use tax 
rates of 15.0% (October 2013 valuation) and 17.0% (January 31, 2013 
valuation), which are lower than my assumed effective tax rate of 21.0%, and 
this may account for Houlihan Lokey’s conclusion that some amount of 
additional tax liability might need to be taken into account.  (Dell Inc., 
Discussion Materials, October 2013, p. 13 (DELLE00780000); Denali 
Holdings, Inc., Valuation Analysis as of January 31, 2014, p. 3.) 
160 FIN 48, Appendix A, p. 17. 
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Deferred Tax Liability 
73. According to Professor Hubbard, Dell has $6.3 billion of deferred 
taxes that need to be paid on overseas profits that have not yet been repatriated.  He 
relied on Professor Shay for this assumption161 and stated that “while this tax 
liability is currently identified as being ‘indefinitely’ overseas, at some point it will 
not be possible for Dell to continue deferring this liability.  Similar to the 
accumulated overseas deferrals as of October 29, 2014, the additional deferrals 
resulting from the difference between the marginal rate of 35.8 percent and the 
lower tax rates modeled during the projection and transition periods would also 
need to be eventually recognized and paid.”162  Professor Hubbard’s inclusion of 
the Deferred Tax liability reduces his implied per share equity value by $1.25 per 
                                                            
161  Professor Shay recommended that Professor Hubbard use a 25-year payment 
period for purportedly deferred taxes because the latter’s DCF analysis 
“calculates the cash flows of the enterprise that are available as returns to the 
investors or reinvestment anywhere in the business,” and concluded without 
further explanation that “it is inconsistent to assume that these earnings will 
never be subject to U.S. tax.”  (Shay Report, ¶ 51)  
162  Hubbard Report, ¶ 269.  Professor Hubbard modeled these deferred liabilities as 
accumulating and deferring to the terminal period and then being paid off over 
time.  He carried the $6.3 billion amount forward to the terminal year but did 
not increase the amount over time.  He then added to the $6.3 billion the year-
by-year additional deferrals of the tax amounts resulting from the difference 
between the 18.5% rate he used during the forecast period and the 35.8% rate 
he used during the terminal period.  He then assumed straight-line repayment 
over a 25-year period starting in the terminal year.  He discounted these 
calculations at his WACC estimate of 9.46% to arrive at a present value 
deferred tax liability of $2.2 billion as of October 29, 2013. (Hubbard Report, ¶ 
270-71, Hubbard Exhibit 23.) 
 
55 
share in the Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case and by $1.27 per share in the Hubbard 
Adjusted Bank Case valuations.  (See Revised Exhibit 1.) 
74. Neither Professor Hubbard nor Professor Shay cites any external 
support for the idea that Dell must repatriate its offshore cash “at some point” but 
simply conclude that such repatriation must necessarily take place.  In fact, I find 
no evidence to support an assumption that Dell did not plan to use the profits 
earned overseas to support its significant overseas operations.163  Dell had been 
investing heavily in its enterprise business in China and had plans to increase its 
investment in India, Indonesia, and Brazil, particularly in smaller cities.164  Mr. 
Dell testified that Dell expected to double the number of stores in India during FY 
2016 and “accelerated the pace of investment” in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Mexico, and other emerging markets “to be able to grow the business long-
term.”165  Moreover, Mr. Rajkovic, J.P. Morgan’s representative, testified that Dell 
had no plans to repatriate its overseas cash,166 such that it is unclear if and when 
any such repatriation would occur.  As I described above, there are several ways 
corporations can access cash without repatriating “offshore” cash.  For these 
                                                            
163  As of FY 2013, Dell operated in over 50 countries and over 50% of its revenue 
and at least 40% of its gross profit was earned outside the U.S.  (Dell Exhibit 25 
(Dell Rating Agency Presentation, August 2013), p. 29.) 
164  Gladden Deposition, pp. 202-203. 
165  Dell Deposition, pp. 156-57. 
166  Rajkovic Deposition, p. 52. 
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reasons, it is speculative to assume that Dell will necessarily have to repatriate its 
“overseas” cash and pay U.S. taxes on those overseas profits. 
75. Further, Professor Hubbard’s Deferred Tax Liability calculation 
implies that Dell would not pay a 35.8% marginal tax rate over the 25-year period 
beginning in FY 2024, but instead would pay an average effective tax rate of 
45.6% in those years.  (See Exhibit 11.)  As discussed above, this assumption is 
inconsistent with Dell’s historical experience of paying far lower than the marginal 
tax rate167 and presumes, without any foundation, that Dell will not only pay the 
highest marginal tax rate on its current earnings but will also pay taxes on past 
earnings in the terminal period.  
76. Valuation texts do not support deducting deferred tax liabilities (or 
assets) in arriving at a company’s equity value from its enterprise value.  A leading 
valuation textbook notes that “[d]eferred tax assets and liabilities classified as 
operating will flow through NOPLAT [Net Operating Profit or Loss After Tax] via 
cash taxes.  As part of NOPLAT, they are also part of free cash flow and are not 
valued separately.”168  This approach is seconded by another leading valuation 
textbook, which states that “When valuing the equity of a company, we subtract 
                                                            
167  Exhibit 5 shows that not only has Dell’s tax rate generally been well below the 
marginal rate, it has declined over time. 
168  Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 540. 
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the value of the non-equity claims from the value of the firm.  However, we do not 
include deferred tax liabilities (or add the value of deferred tax assets) when 
measuring the value of common equity by taking the value of the firm less the 
market value of the non-common equity claims.”169  This is consistent with the use 
of tax rates far lower than the marginal tax rate in the terminal value period in both 
the BCG 25% Case and the Bank Case projections.   
77. Finally, none of the twelve DCF valuations I have reviewed reduce 
Dell’s enterprise value by a deferred foreign income tax liability in arriving at its 
equity value.  (See Exhibit 4.)  For these reasons, I conclude that Professor 
Hubbard’s inclusion of a deferred foreign income tax liability as reduction to his 
DCF value is speculative and not supported by either the evidence in the record or 
standard valuation practice. 
Net Operating Loss Carryforwards 
78. Professor Hubbard increases his DCF estimate of Dell’s enterprise 
value by $278 million in deferred tax assets related to carryforwards of prior Net 
Operating Losses (NOLs) as estimated by Professor Shay.170  This deferred tax 
asset has the effect of increasing his per share estimate of Dell’s equity value for 
                                                            
169  Holthausen, Robert W. and Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation: Theory, 




both his BCG 25% and his Bank Cases by $0.16 per share.  (See Revised Exhibit 
1.) 
79. None of the twelve DCF analyses I have reviewed includes a deferred 
tax asset for Dell’s NOL carryforwards (see Exhibit 4).  Further, Professor 
Hubbard has not provided any evidence that Dell’s management did not include 
the effect of these carryforwards in determining that 21.0% was the appropriate tax 
rate to apply in Dell’s projections. 
VI. PROFESSOR HUBBARD’S WACC IS TOO HIGH 
80. I estimated Dell’s WACC to be 9.03%, while Professor Hubbard 
estimated Dell’s WACC to be 9.46%,171 which is almost a full percentage point 
higher than Dell’s internal WACC estimate of 8.5%.172  Professor Hubbard’s use of 
a 9.46% WACC rather than a 9.0% WACC lowers his DCF valuation using the 
Hubbard Adjusted BCG Case projections by $0.57 per share and using the 
Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case projections by $0.75 per share.  (See Revised 
Exhibit 1.)  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
170  Hubbard Report, ¶ 268; Shay Report, ¶¶ 57-58.  
171  Cornell Report, ¶ 111 and Exhibit 7; Hubbard Report, ¶ 257 and Exhibit 16.  I 
based my estimate of Dell’s fair value on the average of my two DCF 
valuations using the BCG 50% Case and Bank Case with Additional Cost 
Savings projections on a WACC estimate of 9.0%, but also show the sensitivity 
of my valuation results to the WACC that Dell used in the normal course of 





81. The largest driver of the difference in our WACC estimates is 
Professor Hubbard’s use of a higher estimate of the market equity risk premium 
(6.41%) than I did (5.50%).173  (See Exhibit 12.)  I discuss the impact of the equity 
risk premium below, as well as why I believe that my choice results in a better 
estimate of Dell’s WACC as of the Appraisal Date.174  This difference is offset to a 
minor extent by three inputs for which my selected input resulted in an otherwise 
higher WACC estimate than did Professor Hubbard’s input:  cost of debt, tax rate 
and beta.  I discuss the impact of these three inputs and why I believe my choices 
result in a better estimate of Dell’s WACC in Appendix B.    
82. Professor Hubbard based his estimate of the appropriate forward-
looking market equity risk premium of 6.41% on the average of the historical 
(6.70%) and supply side (6.11%) equity risk premium estimates published by 
                                                            
173  Hubbard Report, ¶ 250; Cornell Report, ¶ 110. 
174  The two remaining inputs (risk free rate and target capital structure) do not 
impact the difference in our WACC estimates.  Both Professor Hubbard and I 
use the 3.31% yield on 20-year U.S. Treasury Securities as of October 29, 2013 
in our calculation of Dell’s WACC.  Professor Hubbard uses Dell’s average 
debt to total capital ratio calculated on a quarterly basis between January 12, 
2011 and January 11, 2013 of 25.25%.  (Hubbard Report, Exhibit 11.)  I 
estimate Dell’s target capital structure to be 24.75% using Dell’s market 
capitalization immediately prior to rumors of the Buyout Transaction and its 
estimate debt balance as of October 29, 2013 (Cornell Report, ¶ 103).  Since we 
both assume that Dell’s historical capital structure of approximately 25% will 
remain its target going forward, and the difference in estimates of 0.5% in the 
debt to total capital ratio does not impact either WACC estimate, I consider 
either estimate to be an acceptable input for estimating Dell’s WACC. 
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Ibbotson Associates.175  These estimates are based on the long-term arithmetic 
average return of stocks over 20-year treasury bonds over the period 1926 to 
2012.176   
83. In contrast, I arrived at my estimate of the forward-looking market 
equity risk premium of 5.5% based on a current calculation of the implied equity 
risk premium based on current market returns, as well as a thorough review of 
academic and practitioner literature, and my experience, research, and writings.177  
As I noted in the Cornell Report, research by academics and practitioners over the 
last 20 years indicates that the forward-looking equity risk premium is significantly 
lower than the long-run historical average.178  As a result, it is my opinion that 
Professor Hubbard inflates his equity risk premium estimate by placing any weight 
                                                            
175  Hubbard Report, ¶ 250. 
176  Hubbard Report, ¶ 247; 2013 SBBI Valuation Yearbook, p. 66. 
177  Cornell Report, ¶ 110. 
178  See Bradford Cornell, The Equity Risk Premium: The Long-Run Future of the 
Stock Market, John Wiley & Sons, 1999; see also Bradford Cornell, “Economic 
Growth and Equity Investing,” Financial Analysts Journal, Volume 66, No. 1, 
2010; Robert D. Arnott & Peter L. Bernstein, “What Risk Premium Is 
“Normal”?,” Financial Analysts Journal, Volume 58, No. 2, March/April 2002; 
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, “The Equity Premium,” The Journal of 
Finance, Volume LVII, No. 2, April 2002.  In addition, surveys of CFOs 
consistently report an average equity risk premium significantly lower than the 
historical equity risk premium. A survey of 404 CFOs conducted by Professors 
John Graham and Campbell Harvey in September 2013 reported an average 
equity risk premium of 3.11%. (John R. Graham and Campbell R. Harvey, “The 
Equity Risk Premium in 2014,” Duke University Working Paper) 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422008), p. 8.)   
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(in his case, 50%) on the historical equity risk premium.  Moreover, although the 
supply side estimate attempts to correct the historical equity risk premium by 
adjusting that estimate to reflect recent expectations of equity returns based on real 
earnings growth, the current 6.11% estimate exceeds that of other forward-looking 
estimates available as of the Appraisal Date.179  Moreover, in a recent survey of 
150 valuation and finance textbooks, the average equity risk premium estimated by 
those authors who took current market values into account was 4.8%, and the most 
recent five-year moving average estimate recommended by the textbooks was 
5.7%.180  Thus, I continue to believe that my estimate of 5.5% represents the 
appropriate equity risk premium for purposes of valuating Dell as of October 29, 
2013.  Had Professor Hubbard instead used by 5.5% equity risk premium estimate, 
                                                            
179  Surveys of CFOs consistently report an average equity risk premium 
significantly lower than the historical equity risk premium. A survey of 404 
CFOs conducted by Professors John Graham and Campbell Harvey in 
September 2013 reported an average equity risk premium of 3.11%. (John R. 
Graham and Campbell R. Harvey, “The Equity Risk Premium in 2014,” Duke 
University Working Paper 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422008), p. 8.)  Professor 
Damodaran calculates implied equity risk premiums on a monthly basis based 
on the required return on the S&P 500 Index (measured using its dividend and 
stock buyback yields) less the risk free rate. The monthly ERP for October 2013 
was 5.59%.  Aswath Damodaran, “Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, 
Estimation and Implications – 2014 Edition,” NYU Stern School of Business, 
March 2014, pp. 67-68, 79 (Figure 12 and backup data retrieved from 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/).  
180  Fernandez, Pablo, “The Equity Premium in 150 Textbooks,” Unpublished 
Working Paper, January 9, 2015, pp. 2-3. 
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his concluded WACC would have been 8.58%, which is almost identical to Dell’s 
internal WACC estimate of 8.5%.181  (See Exhibit 12.) 
84. After considering the Hubbard Report, I continue to believe that my 
WACC represents the best estimate of Dell’s discount rate as of the Appraisal 
Date.  I also note that my WACC estimate of 9.0% is closer to Dell’s internal 
WACC estimate of 8.5%. 
VII. PROFESSOR HUBBARD INAPPROPRIATELY ASSUMES DELL 
SHOULD NOT BE VALUED BASED ON A SUM OF THE PARTS 
ANALYSIS 
85. In his report, Professor Hubbard concluded that sum of the parts 
(SOTP) analyses were most appropriate for “conglomerates, where there is truly a 
collection of free-standing and non-interconnected businesses that could be run 
separately or sold with little or no effect on the other businesses.”182  He explains 
that an SOTP analysis is not appropriate for Dell because Dell was “highly 
integrated and interconnected” and was becoming even more interconnected by 
offering integrated “IT solutions” to customers that included hardware, software, 
support, and services.183  To support this conclusion, Professor Hubbard cited 
testimony by Mr. Rajkovic, who stated that J.P. Morgan did not perform an SOTP 
                                                            
181 DELLE00197210. 
182  Hubbard Report, ¶ 292. 
183  Hubbard Report, ¶ 292. 
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analysis because Dell’s business “was not separable” and that “the majority of the 
businesses within Dell are driven by the core business of PCs” such that they could 
not be valued separately, nor could they stand alone as separate entities.184 
86. Professor Hubbard dismissed the fact that sum of the parts analyses 
were performed by Dell internally as well as by equity analysts.185  (See Exhibit 
13.)  Dell’s management, who were more familiar with the Company’s operations 
than anyone else (and thus well-aware to the extent those operations were 
interconnected), performed these analyses and even recommended to analysts that 
they adopt this methodology in order to better understand Dell’s true value.186   
87. Professor Hubbard not only dismisses the importance of a SOTP-type 
analysis, but also the use of any companies that are comparable to Dell’s individual 
business segments other than Hewlett-Packard Co. (“HP”) when he performed his 
estimate of Dell’s fair value based on a comparable company (consolidated) 
trading multiples.187  I agreed in the Cornell Report that only HP was comparable 
to Dell across most of its business operations, but noted that each segment was 
comparable to many companies. 188  Professor Hubbard’s sole choice of HP is also 
                                                            
184  Hubbard Report, ¶ 293. 
185  Hubbard Report, ¶ 291. 
186  Mandl Exhibit 25. 
187  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 289, 298. 
188  Cornell Report, ¶ 125. 
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problematic because Michael Dell has testified that “many people would say that 
[HP was Dell’s closest competitor], but there’s certainly significant differences 
between our business and HP’s business.”189  Further, as I noted in the Cornell 
Report, multiples-based valuations “do not necessarily reflect the intrinsic value of 
an enterprise but instead may reflect under or over-pricing in the market due to the 
economic conditions at the time the trading or transaction multiple is 
calculated.”190  This concern is especially problematic where, as in Professor 
Hubbard’s analysis, the multiples-based valuation relies not on a large number of 
comparable companies for which individual mispricing factors may average out, 
but instead on the trading multiple of one company. 
88. Professor Hubbard’s blanket dismissal of the sum of the parts 
methodology for valuing Dell ignores its usefulness for testing the reasonableness 
of estimates obtained using other methods.  Unlike Professor Hubbard, I performed 
both SOTP multiples and DCF valuation analyses of Dell to test the reasonableness 
of my conclusion of Dell’s fair value based on consolidated DCF valuations.191  
While the SOTP DCF analysis included projections for Dell’s segments that 
factored in the cost savings expected to accrue over the forecast period, the SOTP 
multiples-based analysis based on Dell’s FY 2014 projections would not account 
                                                            
189  Dell Deposition, p. 231. 
190  Cornell Report, ¶ 125. 
191  Cornell Report, Exhibits 14–18, 20 B&C. 
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for the improved profitability and growth projected between FY 2014 and 2018.  
As a result, I normalized Dell’s FY 2014 Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
(“EBIT”) and Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization 
(EBITDA) projections to reflect the full annual impact of the projected cost 
savings.192  For the same reasons explained in the Cornell Report,193 it is my 
opinion that Professor Hubbard’s failure to normalize both the historical and FY 
2014 EBITDA projections further understated the fair value estimates he generated 
from his consolidated trading multiples method.  
89. A sum of the parts analysis is particularly useful in a company such as 
Dell which has a complicated mix of segments with different growth rates and 
profitability that are expected to change over the forecast period.  In the Cornell 
Report, I used the growth rates implied by the segment projections to develop PGR 
estimates for each segment.194  I then used the consolidated results of SOTP DCF 
valuations of the segments to develop an overall consolidated PGR estimate of 
2.32%, which I lowered to 1.0% in order to take into account the possibility that 
Dell’s transformation strategy would not occur within the time horizon 
                                                            
192  Cornell Report, ¶ 127 and Exhibit 19. 
193  Cornell Report, ¶¶ 125-126. 
194  Cornell Report, ¶ 99.  
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projected.195  It is my opinion that my consideration of the segment growth rates 
and resulting SOTP valuations provides independent support for my valuation. 
VIII. E&Y’S ASC 805 DCF VALUATION PROVIDES FURTHER 
EVIDENCE OF THE REASONABLENESS OF MY ESTIMATE OF 
DELL’S FAIR VALUE PER SHARE 
90. To further corroborate my estimates of Dell’s value, I reviewed the 
consolidated DCF analysis in the aforementioned E&Y ASC 805 Valuation as of 
October 29, 2013.  The projections used in this analysis were obtained from Dell’s 
management and appear to represent Dell management’s most recent views on 
Dell’s future performance before the transaction closed.196  Unlike the Bank Case 
with Cost Savings projections, the forecast period for the E&Y valuation runs 
through 2023.  Exhibit 14 compares the projections used in E&Y’s DCF valuation 
with the Bank Case with Cost Savings projections.  Although revenues are higher 
in the E&Y projections, EBITDA and free cash flow are lower.  The E&Y 
projections show a delay of approximately three years in reaching the EBITDA 
levels and a delay of one to two years in reaching the free cash flow levels shown 
in the Bank Case with Cost Savings. 
                                                            
195  Cornell Report, ¶ 100.  
196  Dell Inc. ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, 
DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022. 
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91. E&Y assumes a perpetuity growth rate of 1.2% and a discount rate of 
17.6% to arrive at an estimated enterprise value of $21.1 billion.197  However, 
when I use my estimate of Dell’s WACC of 9.0%198 while holding all other 
assumptions constant, I arrive at an estimated enterprise value of $44.2 billion.  
(See Revised Exhibit 15A.)  Because the projections used in this valuation include 
an imputed charge for the use of Dell’s trade name, I add back E&Y’s estimate of 
Dell’s trade name value of $1.435 billion.199  I then adjust the resulting enterprise 
value by adding estimated cash and investments of $12.469 billion and deducting 
estimated debt of $6.311 billion to arrive at an estimate of Dell’s total equity value 
of $51.772 billion.200  I then divide by fully diluted shares outstanding of 1.784 
billion to arrive at my estimate of Dell’s equity value per share under this scenario 
of $29.02. 
92. If I instead use Professor Hubbard’s estimate of Dell’s WACC of 
9.46%, my estimate of Dell’s equity value per share under this scenario would be 
$27.62.  (See Revised Exhibit 15B.)  The fact that both estimates are close to my 
                                                            
197  Dell Inc. ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, 
DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022. 
198  Cornell Report, ¶ 113. 
199  Dell Inc. ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, 
DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022.  Given that the composite discount rate used to 
value Dell’s trade name across segments is 17.6%, its value would be 
significantly higher (close to double) if either my WACC estimate (9.0%) or 
Professor Hubbard’s estimate (9.46%) is used. 
200  Cornell Exhibit 11. 
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Minor Differences Between WACC Estimates 
A. Cost of Debt  
1. Professor Hubbard and I used a similar approach to estimate Dell’s 
cost of debt (i.e., the yield on an index based on long-term publicly traded debt 
issued by companies with a similar credit rating as Dell).1  I similarly agree with 
Professor Hubbard that the estimate should be based on Dell’s debt rating absent 
any impact of the anticipated Buyout Transaction.2  Whereas Professor Hubbard 
used the yield as of October 29, 2013 on 15-year bonds with Dell’s ‘A’ rating prior 
to the announcement of the Buyout Transaction (4.45%),3 I use a more 
conservative (i.e., value reducing) estimate:  the yield on long-term bonds that 
reflect the downgrade in Dell’s debt rating to ‘BBB’ following the Company’s 
release of its results for the first quarter of FY 2014 in early May 2013 (4.95%).4  
                                                            
1  Hubbard Report, ¶ 254; Cornell Report, ¶ 104. 
2  Hubbard Report, ¶ 254; Cornell Report, ¶ 104. 
3  Hubbard Report, ¶ 255. 
4  Cornell Report, ¶ 104; “Dell Inc. Ratings Lowered To ‘BBB’ On Weak 
Operating Performance; Ratings Remain on CreditWatch Negative,” S&P 
Ratings Direct Research Update, May 20, 2013.  I use this rating because the 
report specifically references Dell’s weak operating results as the reason for the 
downgrade, whereas the report characterizes the proposed Buyout Transaction 
as having only a “modest” chance of “materially degrad[ing] Dell’s financial 
risk profile,” finding instead that it may result in a future downgrade and thus 
justifies S&P’s decision to maintain a CreditWatch with negative implications 





Had Professor Hubbard instead used my 4.95% cost of debt estimate, his 
concluded WACC would have been 9.55%.  (See Exhibit 12.) 
B. Tax Rate 
2. Professor Hubbard relies on the marginal tax rate of 35.8% identified 
in the Shay Report to estimate Dell’s combined statutory rate for purposes of his 
calculation of Dell’s after-tax cost of debt.5  Professor Hubbard also calculates the 
after-tax amount of Dell’s estimated excess cash using a 35.8% tax rate for 
purposes of the cash adjustment factor used in his beta adjustment (discussed 
below).6   
3. After considering the Hubbard Report (and his reliance on the Shay 
Report), I continue to believe that using Dell management’s 21.0% estimate of its 
effective tax rate is the appropriate rate to use in estimating Dell’s WACC.  As the 
table below shows, my use of a 21.0% tax rate is consistent with the rate used in 




5  As I discuss below, because Professor Hubbard uses an unlevering formula for 
calculating his beta estimate that assumes debt has no risk, he does not apply a 
tax shield to his unlevering formula as I do.  (Hubbard Report, fn. 322 and 
Exhibit 16; Cornell Report, Exhibit 6.) 










Had Professor Hubbard instead used my 21.0% tax rate, his concluded WACC 
would have been 9.63%.  (See Exhibit 12.) 
C. Beta 
4. Professor Hubbard and I used similar beta estimates in calculating 
Dell’s WACC (1.31 vs. 1.35).11  Professor Hubbard and I agreed that a cash 
adjustment factor must be applied in calculating beta and we both used two years 
of weekly Bloomberg data, a measurement period from January 14, 2011 through 
January 11, 2013, and the S&P500 as the market portfolio.12   
5. We differed, however, in our starting point for estimating Dell’s beta 
and in the mechanics of our cash adjustment.  Professor Hubbard started with 
Dell’s two-year, weekly beta estimate as of January 11, 2013, whereas I obtained 
beta estimates for each of my selected peer companies.13  We both then unlevered 
                                                            
7  EVERCORE00004835.xlsm; EVERCORE00051053.xlsm. 
8  JPM_0003324.xlsm; JPM_0119609.xlsm. 
9  GSDELL00000035662.xlsx, “DCF” Tab, Cells L32:Q32. 
10  Dell Inc., Discussion Materials, October 2013. 
11  Hubbard Report, ¶ 245; Cornell Report, ¶ 109. 
12  Hubbard Report, ¶¶ 235-237, 240-243; Cornell Report, ¶¶ 108-109. 
13  As I noted in the Cornell Report, I found it more appropriate to estimate Dell’s 
beta based on the median peer company beta than its own historical beta due to 





these betas (i.e., removed the impact of the existing capital structure), which 
resulted in unlevered beta estimates of 0.83 for Professor Hubbard and 0.94 for me 
(based on the median of the unlevered peer company betas).14 
6. I took the median unlevered beta of 0.94 and applied my cash 
adjustment (based on the median ratio of cash to firm value for the peer companies 
of 12.1%) to calculate a cash-adjusted unlevered peer beta of 1.07.15  I then 
relevered the cash-adjusted unlevered median beta using my target capital structure 
of 24.75% debt to total capital to arrive at my beta estimate of 1.35.16  Professor 
Hubbard instead relevered his beta using his same assumption for Dell’s target 
capital structure and thus arrived at the same 1.11 beta he obtained from his 
regression.17  Hubbard then applied a cash adjustment factor of 1.18, which is 
equivalent to a cash-to-firm value ratio of 15.25% (compared to my 12.1% ratio), 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
since the transformation was expected to make Dell’s operations more similar 
to that of its peers by the end of the forecast period (or soon thereafter).  
(Cornell Report, ¶ 108.)  
14  Professor Hubbard uses a relevering formula that assumes the debt tax shield 
has the same risk as operating assets. (Valuation, 5th Ed., p. 785, Hubbard 
Report, Exhibit 16.)  I make the more conservative assumption and instead use 
a relevering formula that assumes the debt tax shield has the same risk as debt.  
(Corporate Valuation, p. 222, Cornell Report, Exhibit 7.)  The formula used by 
Professor Hubbard assumes that Dell’s debt is risk-free and that its beta is zero.  
Dell’s debt carried a low risk of default, but it was not risk-free, which means 
that Professor Hubbard’s formula results in measurement error.  (See Valuation, 
5th Ed., p. 785.) 
15  Cornell Report, Exhibit 6. 
16  Cornell Report, Exhibit 7. 





to calculate a cash-adjusted beta of 1.31.18  Had Professor Hubbard instead used 




18  Hubbard Report, Exhibit 16.  Professor Hubbard calculates his cash adjustment 
factor using an average excess cash amount measured quarterly over the period 
from Q4 FY 2011 – Q4 FY 2013.  (Hubbard Report, Exhibit 15.)  He assumes 
that $5 billion of cash is needed in Dell’s operations, so his cash adjustment is 
based only on excess cash in each period and, as I discuss above, the excess 
cash amount is also calculated on an after-tax basis using his marginal tax rate 
of 35.8%.  
REVISED EXHIBIT 1
Dell Inc.
Impact of Changes to Hubbard's Assumptions
Per Share Impact of Changes in:
# Adjustment
[1] As Reported $12.52 $14.16
Adjustments to Free Cash Flow Projections (Report Section III)
[2] Impact of Updated PC Forecast $1.35 $0.21
[3] Impact of Attachment Rates $0.96 N/A
[4] Remove reinvestment in second stage $0.44 $0.77
[5] After change in [4]; remove Hubbard's reinvestment amount in terminal period $1.75 $2.09
[6] Include acquisitions in second stage N/A ($0.64)
[7] After change in [5] for BCG Case or [6] for Bank Case; change perpetuity growth rate from 2% to 1% ($1.32) ($1.25)
[8] Change to 25% of $3.3B in cost savings ($0.12) N/A
[9] After change in [8]; grow cost savings at 1% in second stage $0.47 N/A
[10] Change terminal tax rate from 35.8% to 18.5% (i.e., all tax rates at 18.5%) $2.40 $2.82
[11] After change in [10]; change first stage, second stage, and terminal tax rates from 18.5% to 21% (i.e., all tax rates at 21%) ($0.58) ($0.67)
[12] Change Hubbard's stock based compensation expense to Cornell's stock based compensation expense ($0.39) ($0.10)
[13] Remove Private Company Compensation Plan Expense and Incremental Operating Expense N/A $1.24
[14] Other Differences $0.06 $0.58
[15] Section III Subtotal $5.04 $5.04
Adjustments to Include Cost Savings (Report Section IV)
[16] After change in [9]; change to 50% of $3.3B in cost savings and grow at 1% in second stage $3.52 N/A
[17] Include cost savings of $500M in FY 2015 and $1.0B from FY 2016 to FY 2018 and then grow at 1% in second stage N/A $4.20
[18] Section IV Subtotal $3.52 $4.20
Adjustments to Calculate Equity Value (Report Section V)
[19] Change Cash Balance from $6.040 billion to $11.040 billion $2.83 $2.83
[20] After change in [19]; change from Hubbard's Net Debt to Cornell's Net Debt $0.10 $0.10
[21] Change FIN 48 Liability from $3.010 billion to $0 $1.71 $1.71
[22] Change Deferred Tax Liability from $2.199 billion to $0 $1.25 $1.27
[23] Change Net Operating Loss Deferred Asset from $278 million to $0 ($0.16) ($0.16)
[24] Change from Hubbard's shares outstanding to Cornell's shares outstanding ($0.13) ($0.14)
[25] Section V Subtotal $5.59 $5.60
Adjustments to WACC (Report Section VI)
[26] Change WACC from 9.46% to 9.00% $0.57 $0.75
[27] Total Impact of Individual Adjustments $27.24 $29.74
[28] Impact of Cumulating Adjustments $1.67 ($1.43)
[29] Cornell's Conclusion (BCG 50% Case: Revised Exhibit 10 and Bank Case: Revised Exhibit 11) $28.91 $28.31









Impact of Changes to Hubbard's Assumptions
[14]:
[15] = Sum [2]:[14]
[18] = Sum [16]:[17]
[25] = Sum [19]:[24]
[27] = [15] + [18] + [25] + [26]
[28] = [29] - [27]
Includes adjustments for the differences in depreciation, working capital, capital expenditure, Q4 2013 stub period, and after tax restructuring.  For the BCG Case the difference in 
depreciation is $0.15, working capital is $0.20, capital expenditure is ($0.23), and Q4 2013 stub period is ($0.05).  For the Bank Case the difference in depreciation is $0.00, working 
capital is $0.31, capital expenditure is $0.00, Q4 2013 stub period is ($0.04), and after tax restructuring is $0.30. The sum of these amounts differs from the $0.06 per share (Hubbard 
Adjusted BCG 25% Case) and $0.58 per share (Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case) listed under adjustment [14] due to rounding.
EXHIBIT 2A
Dell Inc.
Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate as of FY 2017 using Hubbard Adjusted BCG DCF Model
($ in millions)
# Q4 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022
Terminal 
Value
[1] Free Cash Flow (FCF) $682.5 $2,611.6 $2,673.9 $2,319.0 $2,565.6 $2,468.4 $2,399.3 $2,355.9 $2,337.9 $1,734.6
[2] Terminal Value $23,252.2
[3] Discount Factor 0.989 0.934 0.854 0.780 0.713 0.651 0.595 0.543 0.496 0.496
[4] Discounted Free Cash Flow $674.8 $2,440.5 $2,282.7 $1,808.7 $1,828.0 $1,606.8 $1,426.8 $1,279.9 $1,160.4 $11,540.7
[5] Enterprise Value $26,049.3
[6] FY 2018 to Terminal Value $18,842.7
[7] FY 2017 Discount Factor 0.780
[8] Future Value of Terminal Value $24,159.9
[9] FY 2017 Free Cash Flow $2,319.0
[10] Discount Rate 9.46%
[11] Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate -0.13%
[1]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 18.
[2]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 18.
[3]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 18.
[4]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 18.
[5]: = Sum Line [4]
[6]: = Sum Line [4] from FY 2018 to Terminal Value
[7]: = Line [3] for FY 2017
[8] = [6] / [7]
[9]: = Line [1] for FY 2017
[10]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 16.
[11] = (( [8] * [10] ) - [9] ) / ( [8] + [9] )
EXHIBIT 2B
Dell Inc.
Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate as of FY 2018 using Hubbard Adjusted Bank Case DCF Model
($ in millions)
# Q4 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023
Terminal 
Value
[1] Free Cash Flow (FCF) $613.8 $1,528.2 $1,934.5 $2,276.7 $2,527.7 $2,777.0 $2,863.0 $2,936.9 $2,997.4 $3,043.2 $2,260.0
[2] Terminal Value $30,294.5
[3] Discount Factor 0.989 0.934 0.854 0.780 0.713 0.651 0.595 0.543 0.496 0.453 0.453
[4] Discounted Free Cash Flow $606.9 $1,428.1 $1,651.5 $1,775.6 $1,801.0 $1,807.7 $1,702.6 $1,595.6 $1,487.7 $1,379.9 $13,736.6
[5] Enterprise Value $28,973.1
[6] FY 2019 to Terminal Value $21,710.0
[7] FY 2018 Discount Factor 0.713
[8] Future Value of Terminal Value $30,469.6
[9] FY 2018 Free Cash Flow $2,527.7
[10] Discount Rate 9.46%
[11] Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate 1.08%
[1]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 24.
[2]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 24.
[3]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 24.
[4]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 24.
[5]: = Sum Line [4]
[6]: = Sum Line [4] from FY 2019 to Terminal Value
[7]: = Line [3] for FY 2018
[8] = [6] / [7]
[9]: = Line [1] for FY 2018
[10]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 16.
[11] = (( [8] * [10] ) - [9] ) / ( [8] + [9] )
EXHIBIT 3A
Dell Inc.
Terminal Period Annual Reinvestment Amount for Cornell Bank Case with Cost Savings Projections
($ in millions)
Total
# FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 (FY2013-18) Terminal
[1] Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, and Amortization (EBITA) $4,274 $2,731 $3,648 $4,526 $4,898 $5,135
[2] Add: Stock Based Compensation (Option Expense) 347 362 362 362 362 362
[3] Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Amortization, and Option Expense (EBITAO) $4,621 $3,093 $4,010 $4,888 $5,260 $5,497
[4] Tax Rate 21.0% 21.0% 21.0% 21.0% 21.0% 21.0%
[5] Earnings Before Interest, Amortization, and Option Expense (EBIAO) $3,651 $2,443 $3,168 $3,862 $4,155 $4,343
[6] Less:  After-tax SBC 274 286 286 286 286 286
[7] Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPLAT) $3,376 $2,157 $2,882 $3,576 $3,869 $4,057
[8] Perpetuity Growth Rate (g) 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
[9] Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00%
[10] Required Investment in Following Year (Except Terminal Period) $375 $240 $320 $397 $430 $451 $2,213 $451
[11] Less; Acquisitions ($4,844) ($400) ($400) ($400) ($400) ($400) (6,844) (400)
[12] Less: Annual Increase in Net Working Capital ($614) $470 ($182) ($115) ($71) ($15) (527) (15)
[13] Net Investment Amount ($5,083) $310 ($262) ($117) ($41) $36 ($5,158) $36
[14] Lump-Sum Investment Needed for 1% Perpetuity Growth in Terminal Period $451
[1]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 5A. FY2013 EBITA figure per Dell Inc. FY2013 10-K, p. 65.
[2]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. FY2013 SBC figure per Dell Inc. FY2013 10-K, p. 65.
[3] = [1] + [2].
[4]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[5] = [3] * ( [1] - [4] ).
[6] = [2] * ( [1] - [4] ).
[7] = [5] - [6].
[8]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[9]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[10] = [7] * [8] / [9].
[11]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. FY2013 acquisitions per Dell Inc. FY2013 10-K, p. 65.
[12]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. FY2013 figure from DELLE00734152.xls., tab: Consolidated.
[13]  =  SUM( [10] : [12] ).
[14]  = Terminal [14] /  ( [9] - [8] ).
Notes & Sources: Lump-sum investment amount calculated using Gordon Growth Model assuming that annual reinvestment amount grows at target perpetuity rate:  $451 million Lump-sum Investment Amount = $36 
million incremental required annual investment / (9.0% ROIC - 1.0% g). Formula for reinvestment amount from Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 110.
EXHIBIT 3B 
Dell Inc.
Terminal Period Annual Reinvestment Amount for Cornell BCG 50% Case Projections
($ in millions)
Total
# FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 (FY2013-17) Terminal
[1] Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, and Amortization (EBITA) $3,851 $3,526 $4,120 $4,849 $4,658
[2] Add: Stock Based Compensation (Option Expense) 362 362 362 362 362
[3] Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Amortization, and Option Expense (EBITAO) $4,213 $3,888 $4,482 $5,211 $5,020
[4] Tax Rate 21.0% 21.0% 21.0% 21.0% 21.0%
[5] Earnings Before Interest, Amortization, and Option Expense (EBIAO) $3,328 $3,071 $3,541 $4,116 $3,966
[6] Less:  After-tax SBC 286 286 286 286 286
[7] Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPLAT) $3,042 $2,785 $3,255 $3,830 $3,680
[8] Perpetuity Growth Rate (g) 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
[9] Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00%
[10] Required Investment in Following Year  (Except Terminal Period) $338 $309 $362 $426 $409 $1,844 $409
[11] Less: Acquisitions (4,950) - - - - (4,950) -
[12] Less: Annual Increase in Net Working Capital ($1,355) ($561) ($599) ($439) $6 (2,948) $6
[13] Net Investment Amount ($5,967) ($252) ($238) ($13) $415 ($6,055) $415
[14] Lump-Sum Investment Needed for 1% Perpetuity Growth in Terminal Period $5,188
[1]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 1E.
[2]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 1E.
[3] = [1] + [2].
[4]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[5] = [3] *( [1] - [4] ).
[6] = [2] *( [1] - [4] ).
[7] = [5] - [6].
[8]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[9]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 11.
[10] = [7] * [8] / [9].
[11]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 1E.
[12]:   Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 1E.
[13]  =  SUM( [10] : [12] ).
[14]  = Terminal [14] /  ( [9] - [8]).
Note: Lump-sum investment amount calculated using Gordon Growth Model assuming that annual reinvestment amount grows at target perpetuity rate. $5.188 billion Lump-sum Investment Amount = $415 
million incremental required annual investment / (9.0% ROIC - 1.0% g). Formula for reinvestment amount from Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 110.
EXHIBIT 4
Dell Inc.








































Cash Tax Rates Used in DCF
[1] J.P. Morgan 2/8/2013 See note 21.0% except for 35.0% in Terminal 
Year for 3-year Street and 6-year 
Management Cases and Not Used in 
Fairness Opinion.
[2] J.P. Morgan 8/2/2013 21.0%
[3] Evercore 2/6/2013 See note 21.0% except 35.0% Tax on 
Repatriated Cash in Sensitivity Cases 
Not Used in Fairness Opinion
[4] Evercore 8/2/2013 See note 21.0% except 35.0% Tax on 
Repatriated Cash in Sensitivity Cases 
Not Used in Fairness Opinion





[6] Morgan Stanley X 21.0%
[7] Citi Investment Research X See note FY 2013: 17.5% - 22.5% 
FY 2014 and beyond: 21%
[8] Brean Capital 3/25/13 Imputed 22.2%
[9] Morningstar X Long-run tax rates
 5/24/12: 22.4%
12/22/12 - 8/19/13: 25.0%
[10] Houlihan Lokey October 2013 See note See note 15.0%
[11] Houlihan Lokey 1/31/14 See note See note 17.0%




Services - Support: 10.0%
Services - Other: 30.0%
Software: 25.0%
[13] Hubbard Report X X X X X X X X X FY2014-22: 18.5%
Terminal: 35.8%
Notes and Sources on following page
EXHIBIT 4
Dell Inc.












































[3] EVERCORE00004835.xlsm  Evercore performed sensitivity analyses assuming repatriation of cash with a 35% effective tax rate but did not use these values in its fairness opinion.
[4] EVERCORE00051053.xlsm Evercore performed sensitivity analyses assuming repatriation of cash with a 35% effective tax rate but did not use these values in its fairness opinion.
[5] BCG00013575.xlsx (Ning Exhibit 18)
[6] SLP_DELLAP00015608.  See Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 140.
[7] SLP_DELLAP00038457.  See Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 140.  Citi took working capital requirements out of cash balance instead of treating them as cash flows.
[8] Brean Capital, LLC, Dell, Inc., "Bidding Could Be On With $15 Offer," March 25, 2013
[9]
[10] Dell Inc., Discussion Materials, October 2013.  Includes Dell's estimate of tax and legal liabilities between $800 and $850 million (DELLE00779987-052, at 000).
[11] Denali Holding, Inc., Valuation Analysis as of January 31, 2014.  Includes Dell's estimate of tax and legal liabilities between $835 and $865 million (DELLE00735405-430, at 407)
[12]
[13] Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, pp. 69-146.  Hubbard Exhibits 18 - 26. 
JPM_0003324.xlsm  JPM performed sensitivity analyses assuming repatriation of cash with a 35% tax rate for the terminal period on the 3-year street and 6-year management case analyses that used perpetuity 
growth rates but did not use these values in its fairness opinion.
Morningstar, "Dell Inc.," Reports from May 24, 2012, December 22, 2012, March 1, 2013, May 21, 2013, and August 19, 2013.  There is an offset for "other adjustments" without any details given. As of August 
19, 2013, these adjustments totaled $163 million. (p. 15).


























Effective Tax Rate 
FY 1989 to FY 2013 
Source:  Capital IQ. 
Average Last 10 Years: 2004 to 2013: 23.8% 
Average Last 25 Years: 1989 to 2013: 28.1% 
Average Last 3 Years: 2011 to 2013: 18.5% 
EXHIBIT 6
Dell Inc.
Common Dividends Paid, Share Repurchases and Acquisitions
($ in millions)
Year Common Stock Dividends Share Repurchases Acquisitions
FY2000 $0 ($1,061) $0
FY2001 $0 ($2,700) $0
FY2002 $0 ($3,000) $0
FY2003 $0 ($2,290) $0
FY2004 $0 ($2,000) $0
FY2005 $0 ($4,219) $0
FY2006 $0 ($7,249) $0
FY2007 $0 ($3,026) ($118)
FY2008 $0 ($4,004) ($2,217)
FY2009 $0 ($2,867) ($176)
FY2010 $0 $0 ($3,613)
FY2011 $0 ($800) ($376)
FY2012 $0 ($2,717) ($2,562)
FY2013 ($278) ($724) ($4,844)
Total ($278) ($36,657) ($13,906)
Sources: Capital IQ; Dell, Inc. 2004 Form 10-K, p. 33.
Note: $172 million acquisition figure excluded in 2004 because figure represents cash assumed in consolidation of 
Dell Financial Services L.P.
EXHIBIT 7
Dell Inc.
Comparison of Historical Margins to Bank Case Projections
# Line Item 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Corporate General & Administrative Expense as a % of Revenue
[1] Historical 11.40% 12.22% 11.87% 13.73% 14.23%
[2] Bank Case 13.12% 13.02% 12.93% 12.82% 12.75%
[3] Bank Case with Cost Savings 13.12% 13.53% 13.92% 13.79% 13.70%
EBITDA Margin
[4] Historical 6.94% 6.16% 7.25% 8.73% 7.42%
[5] Bank Case 5.71% 6.38% 6.85% 7.25% 7.50%
[6] Bank Case with Cost Savings 5.71% 7.23% 8.51% 8.86% 9.08%
[1] , [4] : Capital IQ.
[2] , [5] : Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2.
[3] , [6] : Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. Breakdown of cost savings, where 60% of planned savings are in operating expenses, from Durban 
Exhibit 19 (Project Denali, September 2013), p. 82 (DELLE00239046-48). 
Notes & Sources: EBITDA = Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization. Bank Case Corporate G&A calculated as Total Operating Expense less 
R&D expense per Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 2. Bank Case with Cost Savings Bank Case Corporate G&A calculated as Total Operating 
Expense less R&D expense, and including bank case cost savings per Durban Exhibit 19 (Project Denali, September 2013), p. 82 (DELLE00239046-48). 
EXHIBIT 8
Dell Inc.
Comparison of Projections for Net Working Capital Investment and Total Net Reinvestment
2014-2018
($ in millions)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
AUDIT
Revenues
9/21 Management Case $59,933 $63,232 $66,567 $68,019 $69,562
% Growth 4.25% 5.51% 5.27% 2.18% 2.27%
BCG Base Case $56,448 $55,511 $55,050 $54,339 $53,398
% Growth (0.70%) (1.66%) (0.83%) (1.29%) (1.73%)
Bank Case $57,200 $58,713 $60,240 $62,031 $63,154
% Growth 0.46% 2.65% 2.60% 2.97% 1.81%
Net Working Capital (NWC) Investment
9/21 Management Case ($1,208) ($884) ($694) ($153) ($144)
% of Revenue 2.02% 1.40% 1.04% 0.22% 0.21%
BCG Base Case ($247) ($398) ($217) ($462) ($91)
% of Revenue 0.44% 0.72% 0.39% 0.85% 0.17%
Bank Case $470 ($182) ($115) ($71) ($15)
% of Revenue (0.82%) 0.31% 0.19% 0.11% 0.02%
Capital Expenditures (CapEx)
9/21 Management Case ($600) ($600) ($600) ($600) ($600)
% of Revenue 1.00% 0.95% 0.90% 0.88% 0.86%
BCG Base Case ($600) ($600) ($600) ($600) ($590)
% of Revenue 1.06% 1.08% 1.09% 1.10% 1.10%
Bank Case ($552) ($600) ($600) ($600) ($600)
% of Revenue 0.97% 1.02% 1.00% 0.97% 0.95%
EXHIBIT 8
Dell Inc.
Comparison of Projections for Net Working Capital Investment and Total Net Reinvestment
2014-2018
($ in millions)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
AUDIT
Acquisitions
9/21 Management Case ($1,100) $0 $0 $0 $0
% of Revenue 1.84% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
BCG Base Case $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
% of Revenue 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Bank Case ($472) ($400) ($400) ($400) ($400)
% of Revenue 0.83% 0.68% 0.66% 0.64% 0.63%
Depreciation and Amortization (D&A)
9/21 Management Case $586 $586 $586 $586 $586
% of Revenue 0.98% 0.93% 0.88% 0.86% 0.84%
BCG Base Case $586 $586 $586 $586 $586
% of Revenue 1.04% 1.05% 1.06% 1.08% 1.10%
Bank Case $538 $600 $600 $600 $600
% of Revenue 0.94% 1.02% 1.00% 0.97% 0.95%
Total Net Reinvestment (NWC + CapEx + Acquisitions - D&A )
9/21 Management Case ($3,494) ($2,070) ($1,880) ($1,338) ($1,330)
% of Revenue 5.83% 3.27% 2.82% 1.97% 1.91%
BCG Base Case ($1,433) ($1,584) ($1,403) ($1,648) ($1,266)
% of Revenue 2.54% 2.85% 2.55% 3.03% 2.37%
Bank Case ($1,092) ($1,782) ($1,715) ($1,671) ($1,615)
% of Revenue 1.91% 3.04% 2.85% 2.69% 2.56%
Sources: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Appendix F and Exhibits 1A, 2.























2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Dell, Inc. 
Comparison of EBITDA Margins in BCG and Bank Cases  
BCG 50% Forecast BCG 25% Forecast Bank Case w/ Cost Savings Bank Case
Source: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibits 1C, 1E, and 2. 
REVISED EXHIBIT 10
Dell Inc.
Adjustments to Hubbard Net Cash as of October 29, 2013
($ in millions)
# Item Amount
[1] Excess Cash per Hubbard $6,040
[2] Add: Operating Cash per Hubbard $5,000
[3] =  [1] + [2] Total Cash per Hubbard $11,040
[4] Total Transaction-Related Cash Expenditures Paid Between 2/2/13 - 10/28/13 $172
[5] Add: Transaction-Related Debt Repayments 8/2/13 - 10/28/13 $1,506
[6] Less: Transaction Related Proceeds from Debt 8/2/13/ - 10/28/13 ($249)
$12,469
[7] Debt per Hubbard $5,054
[8] Transaction-Related Debt Repayments 8/2/13 - 10/28/13 $1,506
[9] Less: Transaction Related Proceeds from Debt 8/2/13/ - 10/28/13 ($249)
[10] = [7] + [8] + [9] Adjusted Debt $6,311
[11] = [6] - [10] Adjusted Net Cash $6,158
Sources:
[1] - [2], [7]: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 134.




Current Deferred Total Effective
# Fiscal Year EBITAO Tax Payment Tax Payment Tax Payment Tax Rate
[A] [B] = [A] * 35.8% [C] = $11,699 / 25 [D] = [B] + [C] [E] = [D] / [A]
[1] 2023 $3,811 $1,364 $468 $1,832 48.08%
[2] 2024 $3,887 $1,391 $468 $1,859 47.84%
[3] 2025 $3,964 $1,419 $468 $1,887 47.60%
[4] 2026 $4,044 $1,448 $468 $1,916 47.37%
[5] 2027 $4,125 $1,477 $468 $1,945 47.15%
[6] 2028 $4,207 $1,506 $468 $1,974 46.92%
[7] 2029 $4,291 $1,536 $468 $2,004 46.70%
[8] 2030 $4,377 $1,567 $468 $2,035 46.49%
[9] 2031 $4,465 $1,598 $468 $2,066 46.28%
[10] 2032 $4,554 $1,630 $468 $2,098 46.08%
[11] 2033 $4,645 $1,663 $468 $2,131 45.87%
[12] 2034 $4,738 $1,696 $468 $2,164 45.68%
[13] 2035 $4,833 $1,730 $468 $2,198 45.48%
[14] 2036 $4,929 $1,765 $468 $2,233 45.29%
[15] 2037 $5,028 $1,800 $468 $2,268 45.11%
[16] 2038 $5,128 $1,836 $468 $2,304 44.92%
[17] 2039 $5,231 $1,873 $468 $2,341 44.75%
[18] 2040 $5,336 $1,910 $468 $2,378 44.57%
[19] 2041 $5,442 $1,948 $468 $2,416 44.40%
[20] 2042 $5,551 $1,987 $468 $2,455 44.23%
[21] 2043 $5,662 $2,027 $468 $2,495 44.06%
[22] 2044 $5,775 $2,068 $468 $2,536 43.90%
[23] 2045 $5,891 $2,109 $468 $2,577 43.74%
[24] 2046 $6,009 $2,151 $468 $2,619 43.59%
[25] 2047 $6,129 $2,194 $468 $2,662 43.44%
Average 45.58%
Notes:
2) Current Tax Payment at 35.8% statutory tax rate.
Source: Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibits 18 and 23.
3) Deferred Tax Payment based on 25-year straight line repayment of $11.699 billion in deferred taxes.
Professor Hubbard's Implicit Average Taxes Assuming Payment of Deferred Taxes Over 
25-Year Period




Hubbard Adjusted to Use
Cornell Cornell Cornell Cornell
Line Item Hubbard ERP Cost of Debt Tax Rate Beta
Cost of Equity:
Risk Free Rate [1] 3.31% 3.31% 3.31% 3.31% 3.31%
Equity Risk Premium [2] 6.41% 5.50% 6.41% 6.41% 6.41%
Unlevered Adjusted Beta [3] 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Cash/Firm Value Ratio [4] 15.25% 15.25% 15.25% 15.25%
Cash Adjustment Factor [4] 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18
Hubbard Relevered Beta [5] = [3] * ( 1+ [6] ) 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11
Cornell Cash Unlevered Beta [6] = [3] * [4]
Assumed Dell D/E [7] = ( 1 - [12] ) / [12] 33.78% 33.78% 33.78% 33.78%
Tax Rate [8] 35.80% 18.50% 18.50% 21.00%
Hubbard Cash Adjusted Relevered Beta [9] = [4] * [5] 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31
Cornell Relevered Cash + Market Adjusted Beta [10] = [6] * ( (1 + (1 - [8]) * [7] ) 1.35
Cost of Equity [11] = [1] + [2] * [10] 11.70% 10.52% 11.70% 11.70% 11.94%
Equity Weight [12] 74.75% 74.75% 74.75% 74.75% 74.75%
Cost of Debt:
Pre Tax Cost of Debt [13] 4.45% 4.45% 4.95% 4.45% 4.45%
Tax Rate [14] = [8] 35.80% 35.80% 35.80% 21.00% 35.80%
After Tax Cost of Debt [15] = [13] * ( 1 - [14] ) 2.86% 2.86% 3.18% 3.52% 2.86%
Debt Weight [16] = 1 - [12] 25.25% 25.25% 25.25% 25.25% 25.25%
WACC [17] = [11] * [12] + [15] * [16] 9.47% 8.58% 9.55% 9.63% 9.65%
Sources: Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 7.  Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, Exhibit 16.
EXHIBIT 13
Dell Inc.
Summary of Sum-of-the-Parts Valuations
2011-2013
Valuation Date
# Party Published Date As of Date Segments Adjustments Value Conclusion
[1] Dell 1/17/2011 1/14/2011 1) Consumer
2) Small & Medium Business
3) Large Enterprise & Public
$27.05/share






[3] Jefferies 1/15/2013 1/15/2013 1) PCs
2) Software and Peripherals
3) Servers and Networking
4) Enhanced Services (Perot and PC Services)
5) Storage
$13.00/share
[4] Icahn/Southeastern 2/8/2013 2/8/2013 1) Dell Financial Services (DFS)
2) Server Business
3) Support and Deployment
4) PC Business
5) Software and Peripherals
SOTP analysis also includes value of net cash, 
acquisitions since 2008, unallocated expenses, 
and DFS value embedded in segments.
$23.72/share
[5] Brean Capital 2/14/2013 2/14/2013 1) Desktop
2) Mobility
3) Servers & Networking
4) Storage
5) Services
6) Software & Peripherals
$13.20 (based on P/E multiple)
$19.90 (based on EV/EBITDA multiple)
$16.60 (blended)
[6] Brean Capital 3/25/2013 3/25/2013 1) Desktop
2) Mobility
3) Servers & Networking
4) Storage
5) Services
6) Software & Peripherals
$13.20 (based on P/E multiple)
$19.90 (based on EV/EBITDA multiple)
$16.60 (blended)








SOTP Analysis also includes value of net cash. $12.15-$14.74/share
$21.7 billion-$26.4 billion for Implied Value
Notes & Sources (on following page):
EXHIBIT 13
Dell Inc.
Summary of Sum-of-the-Parts Valuations
2011-2013
Notes:
1. As of date is assumed to be the same as published date if not stated.
2. $40 billion Enterprise Value as of 2012 Year End was estimated by Dell on July 12, 2012. See  Gladden Exhibit 9, p. 16 (DELL00017564).
Sources:
[1] Dell Investor Relations, Dell Sum of the Parts Analysis, January 17, 2011 (Gladden Exhibit 2), p. 5.
[2] Board of Directors Meeting, Financial Framework, July 12, 2012, Brian Gladden Presentation (Gladden Exhibit 9), p. 16 (DELL00017564).
[3] Jefferies, "LBO Is a Possibility; Raise Target to $13," January 13, 2013, p. 3.
[4] Dell Inc. Schedule 13D, February 8, 2013, pp. 2-3.
[5] Brean Capital, "Dell/HP Previews - Moving Dell to Hold, 'Tho We Agree LBO Undervalues Cash Flow," February 14, 2013, p. 4.
[6] Brean Capital, "Bidding Could Be On With $15 Offer," March 25, 2013, p. 4.
[7] Ex 30 2 of 2 (JPM_0018648).pdf, p. 0 (JPM_0018648).
EXHIBIT 14
Dell Inc.
Comparison of Bank Case with Cost Savings and E&Y Projections
2015-2023
($ in millions)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Revenue
Bank Case w/ Cost Savings $58,713 $60,240 $62,031 $63,154
% Growth 2.60% 2.97% 1.81%
E&Y Case $60,148 $61,717 $63,583 $64,837 $65,915 $66,926 $67,845 $68,726 $69,551
% Growth 2.61% 3.02% 1.97% 1.66% 1.53% 1.37% 1.30% 1.20%
EBITDA
Bank Case w/ Cost Savings $4,248 $5,126 $5,498 $5,735
% Growth 20.69% 7.25% 4.32%
EBITDA Margin 7.23% 8.51% 8.86% 9.08%
E&Y Case $3,347 $3,770 $4,170 $4,487 $4,743 $4,949 $5,129 $5,255 $5,376
% Growth 12.65% 10.63% 7.60% 5.70% 4.35% 3.63% 2.46% 2.29%
EBITDA Margin 5.56% 6.11% 6.56% 6.92% 7.20% 7.40% 7.56% 7.65% 7.73%
Free Cash Flow
Bank Case w/ Cost Savings $2,299 $3,061 $3,398 $3,642
% Growth 33.13% 11.01% 7.19%
E&Y Case $2,396 $2,755 $3,060 $3,317 $3,533 $3,685 $3,823 $3,919 $4,016
% Growth 14.97% 11.09% 8.40% 6.50% 4.30% 3.75% 2.52% 2.47%
Note: EBITDA = Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization.




E&Y ASC 805 Valuation Analysis
Consolidated Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
As of October 29, 2013
($ in millions, except Per Share Values)
Remaining
# 3 Months For the Twelve Month Periods Ending January 31
LTM 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
[1] Total Revenue 56,977,861$  15,130,275$  60,148,170$  61,717,248$  63,583,124$  64,836,918$  65,914,632$  66,925,554$  67,845,259$  68,726,445$  69,550,586$  
[2] Cost of Goods Sold 12,094,588    47,807,568    48,814,609    50,085,617    50,878,419    51,604,731    52,296,211    52,951,281    53,575,822    54,157,882    
[3] Gross Profit 3,035,687$    12,340,602$  12,902,639$  13,497,507$  13,958,499$  14,309,901$  14,629,343$  14,893,978$  15,150,623$  15,392,704$  
[4] Operating  Expenses
[5] Sales and Marketing 1,311,664$    5,547,561$    5,624,487$    5,738,887$    5,817,092$    5,926,380$    6,022,343$    6,103,334$    6,203,890$    6,299,879$    
[6] Research and Development 320,097 1,306,433 1,339,501 1,374,879 1,409,821 1,402,965 1,387,156 1,362,065 1,356,600 1,347,553
[7] General and Administrative 575,284         2,367,116      2,386,567      2,419,775      2,443,351      2,442,547      2,481,089      2,515,151      2,554,095      2,591,364      
[8] Total Operating Expenses 2,207,045$    9,221,110$    9,350,555$    9,533,541$    9,670,264$    9,771,892$    9,890,588$    9,980,550$    10,114,585$  10,238,796$  
[9] EBIT 828,642$       3,119,492$    3,552,084$    3,963,966$    4,288,235$    4,538,009$    4,738,755$    4,913,428$    5,036,038$    5,153,908$    
[10] DFS Operating Interest Expense 20,927 82,630 84,342 86,585 87,835 88,879 89,862 90,762 91,626 92,437
[11] Charge for use of the Dell Trade Name 72,921           290,356         297,969         306,947         312,971         318,175         323,059         327,502         332,565         338,168         
[12] Adjusted EBIT 734,794$       2,746,506$    3,169,773$    3,570,434$    3,887,429$    4,130,955$    4,325,834$    4,495,164$    4,611,847$    4,723,303$    
[13] Income Tax Expense 95,599           340,756         386,588         480,545         535,156         584,784         625,828         660,071         681,799         703,048         
[14] Debt-free Net Earnings 639,195$       2,405,750$    2,783,185$    3,089,889$    3,352,273$    3,546,171$    3,700,006$    3,835,093$    3,930,048$    4,020,255$    
[15] Add: Depreciation Expense 140,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 612,107 623,370 633,556 643,271 652,360
[16] Add/(Less): Changes in DFNWC 14,775 (9,742) (28,608) (29,738) (35,132) (13,274) (15,167) (12,168) (10,879) (4,101)
[17] Less: Capital Expenditures (115,000)        (600,000)        (600,000)        (600,000)        (600,000)        (612,103)        (623,363)        (633,546)        (643,260)        (652,349)        
[18] Debt-free Cash Flow Available for Distribution 678,970$       2,396,008$    2,754,577$    3,060,151$    3,317,141$    3,532,901$    3,684,846$    3,822,935$    3,919,180$    4,016,165$    
[19] Discounting Convention 0.13 0.76 1.76 2.76 3.76 4.76 5.76 6.76 7.76 8.76
[20] Present Value Factor at 9.0% (Cornell WACC Estimate) 0.9890 0.9368 0.8595 0.7885 0.7234 0.6637 0.6089 0.5586 0.5125 0.4701
[21] Present Value - Debt-free Cash Flow 671,477$      2,244,587$   2,367,427$   2,412,893$   2,399,565$    2,344,626$   2,243,546$   2,135,434$   2,008,435$   1,888,199$   
[22] Sum of Present Values - Detailed Periods 20,716,189$  Normalized Debt-Free Cash Flow Data
[23] Add: Present Value - Terminal Year 23,462,398    [31] EBITDA 5,375,663$    
[24] Present Value of Operations 44,178,587$  [32] Less: Depreciation (Normalized) (652,349)        
[25] Add: Dell Trade Name 1,435,000 [33] Adjusted EBIT 4,723,314$    
[26] Add: Cornell Cash and Investments 12,469,000 [34] Income Tax Expense 703,048
[27] Less: Cornell Total Debt (6,311,000) [35] Debt-Free Net Earnings 4,020,266$    
[28] Total Equity Value 51,771,587$  [36] Add: Depreciation (Normalized) 652,349         
[29] Shares Outstanding 1,783,913 [37] Add/(Less): Changes in DFNWC (4,101)
[30] Implied Equity Value per Share 29.02$          [38] Less: Capital Expenditures (652,349)      
[39] Debt-free Cash Flow Available for Distribution 4,016,165$   
Constant Growth Model Data
[40] Debt-free Cash Flow (Normalized) 4,016,165$    
[41] Terminal Year Growth Rate 1.2%
[42] Debt-Free Cash Flow, Year Ahead 4,064,327$    
[43] Divided by: Capitalization Rate 7.8%
[44] Capitalized Value at End of Estimation Period 52,101,411$  
[45] Discount Period 9.26
[46] Present Value Factor at 9.0% (Cornell WACC Estimate) 0.4503
[47] Present Value of Terminal Year 23,462,398$ 
Notes & Sources (on following page):
REVISED EXHIBIT 15A
Dell Inc.
E&Y ASC 805 Valuation Analysis
Consolidated Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
As of October 29, 2013
($ in millions, except Per Share Values)
Sources:  Cash Flow Projections and Terminal Year Growth Rate [1] - [19], [41] -- Dell Inc ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022.  Dell Trade Name Value [25] -- Dell Inc ASC 805 
Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, DELLE00733762-4129 at 4117.  WACC Estimate [20] per Expert Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, p. 71.  Cash and Investments and Total Debt [26] - [27] per Expert Report 
of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Revised Exhibit 11.
REVISED EXHIBIT 15B
Dell Inc.
E&Y ASC 805 Valuation Analysis
Consolidated Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
As of October 29, 2013
($ in millions, except Per Share Values)
Remaining
# 3 Months For the Twelve Month Periods Ending January 31
LTM 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
[1] Total Revenue 56,977,861$  15,130,275$  60,148,170$  61,717,248$  63,583,124$  64,836,918$  65,914,632$  66,925,554$  67,845,259$  68,726,445$  69,550,586$  
[2] Cost of Goods Sold 12,094,588    47,807,568    48,814,609    50,085,617    50,878,419    51,604,731    52,296,211    52,951,281    53,575,822    54,157,882    
[3] Gross Profit 3,035,687$    12,340,602$  12,902,639$  13,497,507$  13,958,499$  14,309,901$  14,629,343$  14,893,978$  15,150,623$  15,392,704$  
[4] Operating  Expenses
[5] Sales and Marketing 1,311,664$    5,547,561$    5,624,487$    5,738,887$    5,817,092$    5,926,380$    6,022,343$    6,103,334$    6,203,890$    6,299,879$    
[6] Research and Development 320,097 1,306,433 1,339,501 1,374,879 1,409,821 1,402,965 1,387,156 1,362,065 1,356,600 1,347,553
[7] General and Administrative 575,284         2,367,116      2,386,567      2,419,775      2,443,351      2,442,547      2,481,089      2,515,151      2,554,095      2,591,364      
[8] Total Operating Expenses 2,207,045$    9,221,110$    9,350,555$    9,533,541$    9,670,264$    9,771,892$    9,890,588$    9,980,550$    10,114,585$  10,238,796$  
[9] EBIT 828,642$       3,119,492$    3,552,084$    3,963,966$    4,288,235$    4,538,009$    4,738,755$    4,913,428$    5,036,038$    5,153,908$    
[10] DFS Operating Interest Expense 20,927 82,630 84,342 86,585 87,835 88,879 89,862 90,762 91,626 92,437
[11] Charge for use of the Dell Trade Name 72,921           290,356         297,969         306,947         312,971         318,175         323,059         327,502         332,565         338,168         
[12] Adjusted EBIT 734,794$       2,746,506$    3,169,773$    3,570,434$    3,887,429$    4,130,955$    4,325,834$    4,495,164$    4,611,847$    4,723,303$    
[13] Income Tax Expense 95,599           340,756         386,588         480,545         535,156         584,784         625,828         660,071         681,799         703,048         
[14] Debt-free Net Earnings 639,195$       2,405,750$    2,783,185$    3,089,889$    3,352,273$    3,546,171$    3,700,006$    3,835,093$    3,930,048$    4,020,255$    
[15] Add: Depreciation Expense 140,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 612,107 623,370 633,556 643,271 652,360
[16] Add/(Less): Changes in DFNWC 14,775 (9,742) (28,608) (29,738) (35,132) (13,274) (15,167) (12,168) (10,879) (4,101)
[17] Less: Capital Expenditures (115,000)        (600,000)        (600,000)        (600,000)        (600,000)        (612,103)        (623,363)        (633,546)        (643,260)        (652,349)        
[18] Debt-free Cash Flow Available for Distribution 678,970$       2,396,008$    2,754,577$    3,060,151$    3,317,141$    3,532,901$    3,684,846$    3,822,935$    3,919,180$    4,016,165$    
[19] Discounting Convention 0.13 0.76 1.76 2.76 3.76 4.76 5.76 6.76 7.76 8.76
[20] Present Value Factor at 9.46% (Hubbard WACC Estimate) 0.9884 0.9338 0.8531 0.7794 0.7120 0.6505 0.5943 0.5429 0.4960 0.4531
[21] Present Value - Debt-free Cash Flow 671,113$      2,237,438$   2,349,969$   2,385,034$   2,361,893$    2,298,118$   2,189,802$   2,075,520$   1,943,881$   1,819,829$   
[22] Sum of Present Values - Detailed Periods 20,332,598$  Normalized Debt-Free Cash Flow Data
[23] Add: Present Value - Terminal Year 21,308,747    [31] EBITDA 5,375,663$    
[24] Present Value of Operations 41,641,344$  [32] Less: Depreciation (Normalized) (652,349)        
[25] Add: Dell Trade Name 1,435,000 [33] Adjusted EBIT 4,723,314$    
[26] Add: Cornell Cash and Investments 12,469,000 [34] Income Tax Expense 703,048
[27] Less: Cornell Total Debt (6,311,000) [35] Debt-Free Net Earnings 4,020,266$    
[28] Total Equity Value 49,234,344$  [36] Add: Depreciation (Normalized) 652,349         
[29] Shares Outstanding 1,782,660 [37] Add/(Less): Changes in DFNWC (4,101)
[30] Implied Equity Value Per Share 27.62$          [38] Less: Capital Expenditures (652,349)      
[39] Debt-free Cash Flow Available for Distribution 4,016,165$   
Constant Growth Model Data
[40] Debt-free Cash Flow (Normalized) 4,016,165$    
[41] Terminal Year Growth Rate 1.2%
[42] Debt-Free Cash Flow, Year Ahead 4,064,327$    
[43] Divided by: Capitalization Rate 8.3%
[44] Capitalized Value at End of Estimation Period 49,200,160$  
[45] Discount Period 9.26
[46] Present Value Factor at 9.0% (Cornell WACC Estimate) 0.4331
[47] Present Value of Terminal Year 21,308,747$ 
Notes & Sources (on following page):
REVISED EXHIBIT 15B
Dell Inc.
E&Y ASC 805 Valuation Analysis
Consolidated Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
As of October 29, 2013
($ in millions, except Per Share Values)
Sources:  Cash Flow Projections and Terminal Year Growth Rate [1] - [19], [41] -- Dell Inc ASC 805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, DELLE00733762-4129 at 4022. Dell Trade Name Value [25] -- Dell Inc ASC 
805 Valuation Analysis as of 29 October 2013, Ernst & Young, DELLE00733762-4129 at 4117.  WACC Estimate [20] per Expert Report of Glenn Hubbard, June 5, 2015, p. 132.  Cash and Investments and Total Debt [26] -[27] per Expert 
Report of Bradford Cornell, June 5, 2015, Revised Exhibit 11.
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